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Abstract
Privacy-Preserving Query Processing on Outsourced Databases in
Cloud Computing
Samira Barouti
Database-as-a-Service (DBaaS) is a category of cloud computing services that
enables IT providers to deliver database functionality as a service. In this model, a
third party service provider known as a cloud server hosts a database and provides
the associated software and hardware supports. Database outsourcing reduces the
workload of the data owner in answering queries by delegating the tasks to pow-
erful third-party servers with large computational and network resources. Despite
the economic and technical benefits, privacy is the primary challenge posed by this
category of services. By using these services, the data owners will lose the control
of their databases. Moreover, the privacy of clients may be compromised since a
curious cloud operator can follow the queries of a client and infer what the client is
after. The challenge is to fulfill the main privacy goals of both the data owner and
the clients without undermining the ability of the cloud server to return the correct
query results.
This thesis considers the design of protocols that protect the privacy of the
clients and the data owners in the DBaaS model. Such protocols must protect the
privacy of the clients so that the data owner and the cloud server cannot infer the
constants contained in the query predicate as well as the query result. Moreover, the
data owner privacy should be preserved by ensuring that the sensitive information in
the database is not leaked to the cloud server and nothing beyond the query result is
revealed to the clients. The results of the complexity and performance analysis indi-
cates that the proposed protocols incur reasonable communication and computation
overhead on the client and the data owner, considering the added advantage of being
able to perform the symmetrically-private database search.
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The new paradigm of cloud computing has matured from a buzzword to a concrete
concept adopted by many leading providers, such as Amazon and Google. By mov-
ing both data and computing away from personal computers into large data centers,
cloud computing will allow computation to be provided as a public utility. Cloud com-
puting has gained interests in the commercial arena due to its desirable features of
scalability, elasticity, fault-tolerance, self-management and pay-per-use. The oppor-
tunity to oﬀer a database management system (DBMS) as an outsourced service has
recently received considerable attention [1,2]. Database-as-a-Service (DBaaS) [3–5] is
a category of cloud computing services that enables IT providers to deliver database
functionality as a service. In this model, the information that belongs to the data
owner, are organized as relational databases and then outsourced to a third-party
service provider, namely cloud server. The cloud server would be given the ability to
store the relational databases, and the capability to answer certain types of queries.
Database outsourcing reduces the workload of the data owner in answering queries
by delegating the tasks to powerful third-party servers with large computational and
1
network resources.
Outsourced databases present invaluable resources for retrieving up-to-date in-
formation and can be used for various purposes, ranging from scientific research as
in the case of medical data, to demographic trend analysis and marketing purposes.
Since outsourced databases are not any longer under the control of the data owner,
database outsourcing poses additional privacy risks to the sensitive information of
individuals. The cloud servers may not be fully trusted by the data owners or may
be susceptible to attacks, launched by malicious parties (both internal and external).
Thus, the privacy of individuals whose records exist in the database may be compro-
mised by the cloud server. Protecting the database records from the cloud server is
known as the database confidentiality.
DBaaS also poses a significant risk while the client is searching the cloud-hosted
database. The privacy of the client may be compromised since a curious cloud oper-
ator can follow the client’s queries and infer what the client is after. Clients’ queries
have been leaked intentionally in some of Google and Facebook applications [6] and
unintentionally in Twitter [7] in real-life incidents. Leaked queries may contain sensi-
tive information such as personal addresses, medical conditions, incomes, credit card
numbers and social security numbers [8, 9]. Therefore, clients are increasingly aware
of the need to protect privacy in their online activities. Privacy-conscious clients will
likely be willing to trade oﬀ the query performance for the query privacy and possi-
bly even pay to subscribe to such a service. The main challenge is how to keep the
sensitive information contained in the queries confidential without undermining the
ability of the cloud server to return correct results. In other words, we are interested
in preserving the client’s access privacy [10] – keeping both the queries and the results
confidential from the cloud server and the data owner. In addition, the protocols for
the database search should protect the data owner privacy ensure in the sense that
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the client learns only the result of her query. The restriction is crucial in situations
where the database privacy is equally of concern such as financial and healthcare
industries.
The following scenario further illustrates the need for having privacy-preserving
query processing (PPQP) on outsourced databases in cloud computing. Consider a
hospital that outsources the medical diagnoses records of its patients using the DBaaS
model. Suppose that a client issues the following queries:
− How many patients are recovered from cancer?
− How many patients are diagnosed with cancer at age 35?
− How many patients are diagnosed with ovarian cancer or womb cancer?
From the constants contained in the queries, the cloud server can infer the
following information about the client, respectively:
− The client suﬀers from cancer.
− The client is 35 years old and suﬀers from cancer.
− The client is a female who suﬀers from the cancer.
Therefore, there is a need to develop protocols for query processing on out-
sourced databases that protect the privacy of both the data owners and the clients
such that protects (1) the database confidentiality against the untrusted cloud server,
(2) the access privacy of the clients such that the cloud server and the data own-
ers cannot infer the constants in the query predicates as well as the query result
and (3) the database privacy such that the cloud server does not provide any other
information beyond the query result to the clients.
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Previous research in the context of secure data outsourcing has focused on these
areas independently. In the case of ensuring database confidentiality of outsourced
data, most of the existing works only focus on ensuring that the database records
should not be disclosed to the cloud server [11–19]. In the case of protecting the access
privacy, also called private information retrieval, the problem has been studied as the
theoretical formulation where the client must be able to retrieve the i-th element from
N data elements without disclosing to the cloud server discovering what the client is
after [20, 21]. Recently, some research works have been done to enable a transition
from index-based PIR to SQL-enabled PIR, however they ignore the privacy of the
database owner [10,22]. The existing solutions that target both the privacy of clients
and data owners are limited to retrieving a single bit or a block of bits [20, 21] in a
specific physical address. In this thesis, we propose protocols that enables to perform
search on the encrypted databases while protecting the mutual privacy of the clients
and the data owners, assuming that all parties are semi-honest adversaries [23] and
the cloud server is untrusted.
Intuitively, the proposed protocols in this thesis organize the records of datasets
as binary search trees, encrypt the records using semantically-secure encryption
schemes and outsource the encrypted datasets that represent the binary search trees to
the cloud server. To execute queries, the search is performed on encrypted datasets by
traversing the tree. To achieve this, the protocols depend on homomorphic properties
of two semantically-secure encryption schemes. Using homomorphic schemes, specific
operations can be performed on the encrypted records directly without the need for
decryption. More specifically, query predicates are evaluated using the Goldwasser-
Micali (GM) cryptosystem [24] and the Fischlin’s protocol [25] for private compar-
ison whereas query aggregate functions are computed using the Paillier cryptosys-
tem [26]. Using semantically-secure encryption schemes, it must be infeasible for a
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computationally-bounded adversary to derive significant information about a message
when given only the ciphertext and the corresponding public key. The engagement of
the data owner in the protocol execution should be minimal. We achieve this by using
threshold cryptosystems such that the decryption process is performed by a specific
number of clients, namely the threshold k. Furthermore, threshold cryptosystems
provide increased security in such a way that any collaboration between fewer than
k clients does not result in a complete decryption. To search datasets eﬃciently in
logarithmic time, we use left-balancing binary search trees. Left-balancing binary
search trees enable a transition from index-based SPIR to SQL-enabled SPIR in such
a way that the nodes of a tree can be stored in an array and the indices of children
are computed arithmetically.
This thesis consists of two parts. The first part considers a system model for
DBaaS where the individuals trust an organization (namely, the data owner) to store
their record while preserving their privacy. In this case, the data owner collects the
information in the unencrypted form and organizes them as databases. The data
owner then encrypts the records with her public key and outsources it to the cloud
server and the clients sends the queries to the cloud server for execution. We in-
vestigate two types of queries over outsourced databases: SQL queries and keyword
search (KS) queries. SQL queries allow the clients to retrieve data from one or more
tables in a database that satisfies the comparison predicates in the WHERE clause.
We assume that the shape of the query is not private but the constants contained in
the query predicate are private and must be protected. This is a reasonable assump-
tion that has been made by similar research proposals in this domain [10]. Keyword
search involves two parties, a server holding a set of payloads (records) and their
associated keywords, and a client who may send queries consisting of keywords and
receive the payloads associated with these keywords [27]. In this case, we aim to hide
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the search word of the client from the database owner and the cloud server. We focus
on Symmetric Private Information Retrieval (SPIR) [28] techniques to achieve the
mentioned privacy goals. SPIR provides means for retrieving data from a database in
a manner that preserves the mutual privacy of the client and the server; the server has
assurance that the client does not learn any information beyond what she is entitled
to, and the client has assurance that the server is oblivious of her choice. We can
refer to SPIR as generalizations of PIR, but it requires extra computational costs.
In the second part, we consider the scenario where the individuals are not willing
to trust an organizations to collect and manage their record. Instead, they prefer
to manage their own record. This model is in particular suitable for the Personal
Health Records (PHRs) system in which the patients are responsible for managing
and sharing their medical records. In this case, the individuals encrypt their records
with a public key and outsource them to the cloud server. Similar to the first part,
our goal is to protect the privacy of individuals against the curious cloud server and
the clients. Moreover, the query privacy of the clients must be protected such that
the cloud server and the individuals do not learn anything about the constants in the
SQL query. To secure the decryption key of the individuals, we employ the threshold
cryptosystems such that an adversary must compromise at least a specific number of
individuals to obtain the decryption keys or recover the encrypted records. We will
also propose some secure distributed tools that enable the cloud server to operate
on the ciphertexts and calculate the maximum, the minimum and the sum. It is
noteworthy that in this model, KS queries can also be answered since a KS query can
be converted to a SQL query [29].
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1.2 Applications
Privacy-preserving query processing has applications in several problem domains in-
cluding:
Healthcare System. Cloud computing is considered as an appropriate model
for future healthcare systems [30–32] that enables the healthcare providers to shift
their electronic medical record (EMR) systems to clouds. Medical database out-
sourcing reduces time-consuming eﬀorts and costly operations to obtain a patient’s
complete medical record and uniformly integrates this heterogeneous collection of
medical data to deliver it to the healthcare professionals. Public healthcare and epi-
demiological studies rely on summary tables of incident counts, collected directly from
hospitals or indirectly via registries. Summary tables provide important statistical
information for public health. In addition, the data inside these tables could be used
by various parties for research purposes.
In this model, the healthcare providers outsource both the querying services
and medical databases to cloud servers whereas clients such as research institutes
and insurance companies issue queries to the cloud servers. Typically, the outsourced
medical databases contain a number of patients with a particular set of discrete
attributes. While, this data often covers a large number of patients, it can still
be disclosive for rare permutations. For example, a rare cancer combined with the
patient’s residential address could be used to discover the patient’s name.
Query privacy is also another concern for clients while querying healthcare sys-
tems since the healthcare queries reveal information about the disease or the medical
treatment history. For instance, if a client issues a query on HIV, the cloud server
can infer that she may suﬀer from HIV.
Financial Systems. Financial institutions require to cooperate with other
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parties such as governmental oﬃces, credit card companies, and other financial orga-
nizations to extract useful information from financial databases. Unlike other indus-
tries in which intellectual properties are protected by patents, the financial industry
that consists of business processes that has been deemed unpatentable by US Patent
Oﬃce, at least until recently [33]. Hence, trade secrecy has become the preferred
method by which financial institutions protect their intellectual properties and limit
the disclosure of their business process, methods and data. The financial databases
usually contain sensitive information about customers such as credit card number,
payment methods, and history of transactions. Releasing these information into the
public domain would clearly disadvantage certain companies and their costumers and
benefit their competitors. On the other hand without this information, regulators
and investors cannot react to financial stability threats in a timely manner. There-
fore, such cooperation requires that the privacy of all involving parties (financial
organizations, investors and customers) to be protected.
Census Bureau. Census is an oﬃcial process through which governments sys-
tematically collect information about their population. Many governmental statistical
agencies distribute data through a third party to the public to be used for example
in demographic research. The published data is classified into two classes [34]:
− Aggregate count data (contigency tables) which contain frequency count infor-
mation stored in tables with one or more attributes. For example, a contingency
table may contain a population count based on zip codes, age range, and smok-
ing status; i.e., in each zip code and each age range, how many people smoke?
− Microdata which are non-aggregate data and each row refers to a person in the
population.
DNA Databases. Consider a pharmaceutical organization interested in pur-
chasing information about particular genome sequences from a public DNA database.
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They may need the information to complete the manufacture of a new medication that
is a secret. Moreover, DNA databases owners have to keep the individual identities
and genome sequences confidential.
In all of the above application scenarios, the concern is that the clients are not
willing to disclose the sensitive information in the queries they send to the servers;
they demand confidentiality for their queries, both from the data owners and the
cloud server holding the data of interest. Additionally, the sensitive information of
individuals including income, customer’s credit card number, treatment history and
DNA sequence are stored by the cloud server and used for responding to the queries
issued by the clients. Protecting these information from adversaries is an important
concern which needs to be addressed.
1.3 Objectives and Contributions
This thesis deals with the problem of designing protocols for privacy-preserving query
processing (PPQP) on outsourced databases in cloud computing. The proposed pro-
tocols aim to protect:
− the access privacy of the clients against the data owner and the cloud server,
i.e., protecting the sensitive constants contained in client’s queries as well as
the query result,
− the privacy of the data owner such that the only piece of information disclosed
to the clients is the query result.
Moreover, the communication overhead must be less than the naive approach
in the average case and be sublinear to the number of records in the database. The
main contributions of this thesis can be summarized as follows:
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− We propose a protocol that enables a client to perform oblivious walk on a left-
balancing binary search tree held by a server and find all possible occurrences
of her query in the tree while providing mutual privacy for both parties. This
protocol protects the client data from being leaked to the server and at the
same time, tree nodes are not revealed to the client.
− We extend the symmetrically-private tree search to the database outsourcing
scenario in cloud computing in order to support symmetrically-private database
search on the database records. We assume that the database owner is fully
trusted in the sense that the individuals provide their database records as clear-
text to her. The data owner represent the database records as a binary search
tree and the clients execute the queries by walking on this tree in an oblivi-
ous manner. The proposed protocols enable to retrieve data from a relational
database while keeping the sensitive information in SQL/keyword search queries
and the query result from being leaked to the cloud server and the data owner.
Moreover, the data privacy of the data owner is protected such that the sen-
sitive information of the individuals are not revealed to the cloud server and
the clients. Our complexity analysis shows that the proposed protocols impose
sublinear communication and computation cost on the client.
− We then present a SQL query processing protocol in cloud computing in the
case that the individuals are not willing to trust the data owner for collecting
and managing their record. Instead, they prefer to manage their own record.
This model is in particular suitable for the Personal Health Records (PHRs)
systems. Cloud-based PHR is a recent trend for patients to store their elec-
tronic health records on the cloud and manage them. We propose a solution
that allows the patients to protect their sensitive records from the cloud server
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using public-key encryption schemes. In addition, our solution allows health or-
ganizations to produce statistical information about encrypted personal health
records stored on the cloud while preventing the patients to infer about what
health organizations are concerned about; not to create panic about epidemics
in the community. To do so, we develop some techniques that enable the cloud
server to securely execute the aggregate SQL queries of the health organization
over encrypted databases while satisfying the privacy goals of all parties.
1.4 Thesis Organization
Chapter 2 overviews the security model adopted in this thesis as well as the cryp-
tographic primitives, utilized in the proposed approaches. Chapter 3 covers some
previous research works related to the research described in this thesis and discuss
our contributions. In Chapter 4, we proposed two protocols for Keyword Search (KS)
and SQL queries assuming that the data owner is fully trusted. The proposed pro-
tocol in Chapter 5 describes our approach if the data owner is not trusted. Finally,





In this chapter, we present an overview of the security model along with some cryp-
tographic primitives that are required for the proposed protocols.
2.1 Secure Multiparty Computation
Consider the scenario where n connected parties hold input xi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. The
parties wish to compute a function f on inputs x1, x2, . . . , xn. The aim of a Secure
Multiparty Computation (SMC) protocol [35] is to enable parties to carry out such
distributed computation task in a secure manner. Secure multi party computation is
concerned with the possibility of deliberately malicious behavior by some adversarial
entities. The aim of these adversaries may be to learn private information or cause
the result of the computation to be incorrect. Two important requirements on any se-
cure computation protocol are privacy and correctness [23]. The privacy requirement
states that parties should learn their output and nothing additional. The correctness
requirement states that each party should receive its correct output. Therefore, the
adversary must not be able to cause the result of the computation to deviate from
the function that the parties intend to compute.
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In general, there are two main types of adversaries:
(a) Semi-honest adversaries: Adversaries correctly follow the protocol specification.
However, the adversary obtains the internal state of all the corrupted parties
and attempts to use this to learn private information. This is a rather weak
adversarial model. However, there are some settings where it can realistically
model the threats to the system. A semi-honest adversary is also called honest-
but-curious or passive.
(b) Malicious adversaries: Adversaries can deviate from the protocol specification,
according to the adversary’s instructions. In general, providing security in the
presence of malicious adversaries is preferred, as it ensures that no adversarial
attack can succeed. Malicious adversaries are also called active adversaries.
It is of course easier to design a solution that is secure against semi-honest adver-
saries, than it is to design a solution for malicious adversaries. A common approach is
to first design a secure protocol for the semi-honest case, and then transform it into a
protocol that is secure against malicious adversaries [36]. This transformation can be
done by requiring each party to use zero-knowledge proofs [37] to prove that each step
it is taking, follows the specification of the protocol. More eﬃcient transformations
are often required, since this generic approach might be rather ineﬃcient and add
considerable overhead to each step of the protocol.
In this thesis, we assume that the adversary model is semi-honest. Therefore,
the clients, the database owner and the cloud server follow the protocol steps, but
they try to infer additional information beyond their prescribed output. In order to
formally claim and prove that a protocol is secure, a precise definition of security for
multiparty computation is required. According to Goldreich [38], a protocol is private
if no party learns anything more than its prescribed output. In particular, the only
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information that should be learned about other parties’ inputs is what can be derived
from the output itself.
An important theorem in SMC is the composition theorem [38]. The basic idea
behind the composition theorem is that it is possible to design a protocol that uses an
ideal functionality as a subprotocol, then analyze the security of the protocol when
a trusted party computes this functionality. If, we prove the security of the larger
protocol that uses the functionality as a subprotocol in a model where the parties
have access to a trusted party computing the functionality. The composition theorem
then states that when the ideal calls to the trusted party for the functionality are
replaced by real executions of a secure subprotocol computing this functionality, the
protocol remains secure.
Many of the protocols based on SMC, as it is the case with the proposed pro-
tocols in this thesis, involve the composition of privacy-preserving sub-protocols in
which all intermediate outputs from one sub-protocol are inputs to the next sub-
protocol. These intermediate outputs are either simulated by the final output and
the local input for each party or as random shares. Using the Composition Theo-
rem [38], it can be proven that if each sub-protocol is privacy-preserving, then the
resulting composition is also privacy-preserving.
2.2 Cryptographic Primitives
2.2.1 Private Information Retrieval
Given a server which holds x; an n-bit string. The client’s objective is to retrieve the
i-th bit without revealing to the server which item has been queried. We stress that
in this model the database is public. Private Information Retrieval (PIR) protocols
allow the client to retrieve data from a public database with communication strictly
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smaller than n. PIR is a weaker version of 1-out-of-n oblivious transfer in which
it is also required that the client should not get information about other database
items. Chor et al. [20] have introduced PIR in the setting of multiple servers where
identical copies of the string x are stored by k ≥ 2 servers. Chor et al. have also
shown that single-database PIR does not exist in the information-theoretic sense.
Nevertheless, Kushilevitz and Ostrovsky [21] have proposed a method for constructing
single-database PIR assuming a certain secure public-key encryption. Most of PIR
protocols are limited to retrieving a single bit, a block of bits [20, 21], or a textual
keyword [39].
Symmetric private information retrieval [40] is an extension to PIR which ad-
dresses database privacy by preventing the client from learning information about any
record except the retrieved records. Oblivious Transfer (OT) schemes generally have
no requirement for sublinear communication complexity, which renders them useless.
It is noteworthy that all existing communication-eﬃcient 1-out-of-n OT schemes are
essentially SPIR.
2.2.2 Homomorphic Encryption
Homomorphic encryption is a form of encryption where a specific algebraic opera-
tion performed on the plaintext is equivalent to another (possibly diﬀerent) algebraic
operation performed on the ciphertext. The idea of performing simple computations
on encrypted messages was first suggested by Rivest et al. [41], who referred to such
computations as privacy homomorphisms. The original motivation for privacy homo-
morphisms was to allow simple computations on encrypted data without decrypting
them. The ability to perform simple deterministic computations on encrypted data
makes homomorphic cryptosystems ideal for creating privacy-preserving protocols.
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Recently, these cryptosystems received attention in cloud computing commu-
nity. To understand the importance of homomorphic encryption, consider the follow-
ing scenario: a user stores her data on some third party’s servers. If she does not
trust the third party, she may wish to store her data encrypted under a public key
encryption scheme and keep her private key local. However, in order to use this data,
in a traditional public key encryption scheme, the user would need to download the
encrypted data to her local machine, decrypt it, perform her desired computations,
and if she wishes to store the result, the user has to encrypt it and send it back to
the server. With homomorphic encryption, a user could instead operate directly on
the encrypted data.
In this thesis, we utilize Paillier cryptosystem [26] which is an additive homo-
morphic public key encryption. Using Paillier’s scheme, given two ciphertexts E(x)
and E(y) of two plaintexts x and y respectively, an encryption of their sum E(x+ y)
can be eﬃciently computed by multiplying the ciphertexts modulo a public key n2,
i.e., E(x+ y) = E(x).E(y) mod n2. The core steps of Paillier encryption/decryption
are represented in Fig. 1. If using p and q of equivalent length, a simpler variant of
the above key generation steps would be to set g = n+ 1, λ = φ(n), and μ = φ(n)−1
mod n where φ(n) = (p− 1)(q − 1).
In addition to the Paillier cryptosystem, we utilize the Goldwasser-Micali (GM)
cryptosystem [42] as well. GM cryptosystem is a semantically-secure scheme based on
the quadratic residuosity assumption. GM-scheme allows computing the exclusive-or
of two encrypted bits, i.e., E(b0) . E(b1) = E(b0 ⊕ b1). The GM scheme is as follows:
the public key is a composite N = pq, where p and q are primes and p = q = 3 mod
4. The private key consists of the factorization of N . To encrypt bit mi ∈ {0, 1},
choose a random element y ∈ ZN and send C = xmi . y2 mod N . Decryption of
ciphertext C proceeds by determining whether C is a quadratic residue or not. First,
16
Figure 1: Paillier Cryptosystem [26]
Key Generation.
1. Alice generates two distinct large prime numbers, namely p
and q such that GCD
(
pq, (p − 1)(q − 1)
)
= 1 and computes
the modulus n = p.q and λ = lcm(p− 1, q − 1).
2. Alice selects an integer g such that g ∈ Z∗n2 .
3. She computes μ = (L(gλ mod n2)) mod n, where L(u) = u−1
n
The public key consists of (n, g). The secret key is (λ, μ).
Message Encryption. Suppose that Bob wishes to send message m
to Alice:
1. Bob selects a random number r and computes c = gm. rn mod
n2.
2. Bob sends the ciphertext c.
Message Decryption. Alice computes the message m = L(cλ mod
n2) . μ mod n.





. If J = 1, then the ciphertext is ill-formed (i.e.,
the encryption algorithm was not run honestly, or else the message was corrupted
in the transmission); therefore, simply output ⊥. If J = 1, we may decide whether
C is a quadratic residue by computing b′ = C(N−p−q+1)/4 mod N . Note that C is
a quadratic residue iﬀ b′ = 1. At this point, the original plaintext can be recovered
by computing b = (1 − b′)/2. GM cryptosystem is semantically secure under the
quadratic residuosity assumption.
Sander, Young, and Yung [43] described an AND-homomorphic extension of
the GM-encryption scheme henceforth referred to as AND-GM encryption. In this
scheme, each bit of the message is encrypted using a vector of basic GM encryptions
with size λ. λ is chosen to be a suﬃciently large number such that 2−λ is small
enough. In AND-GM cryptosystem, we encrypt b = 1 as a sequence of λ random
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Figure 2: Goldwasser-Micali (GM) Cryptosystem [42]
Key Generation. The modulus used in GM encryption is generated
randomly in the same manner as in the RSA cryptosystem.
1. Alice generates two distinct large prime numbers, namely p
and q and computes the modulus N = pq.


















The public key consists of (x,N). The secret key is the factor-
ization (p, q).
Message Encryption. Suppose that Bob wishes to send message m
to Alice:
1. Bob encodes m as a sequence of bits (m1, ...,mn).
2. For each bit mi, Bob generates a random value y such that
GCD(y,N) = 1 and outputs ci = y
2xmi mod N
3. Bob sends the ciphertext (c1, ..., cn).
Message Decryption. Alice receives ciphertext (c1, ..., cn) from Bob.
1. For each i, using the prime factorization (p, q), Alice deter-
mines whether the value ci is a quadratic residue: if so, mi = 0,
otherwise mi = 1.
2. Alice outputs the message m = (m1, ...,mn).
18
Figure 3: GM to AND-GM ciphertext conversion [43]
convert(c)
//converts GM to GM-AND ciphertext
given c = EGM(m, y) = x
m y2
for i = 0 to λ− 1
choose random ri such that GCD(ri, N) = 1
choose random si ∈ {0, 1}
if si = 0 then Ci ← c . x . EGM(0, ri) mod N
else Ci ← EGM(0, ri) mod N
output C0, . . . , Cλ−1
quadratic residues (i.e., as λ GM-encryptions of 0), and b = 0 as a sequence of λ
random elements (i.e., as λ GM-encryptions Enc(ai) for random bits a1, . . . , aλ). The
decryption scheme takes a sequence of λ elements of GM ciphertext and returns 1
if all elements are quadratic residues, and 0 otherwise (i.e., if there is a quadratic
non-residue among the elements). There is a small probability of 2−λ that a 0-bit is
encrypted as a sequence of λ quadratic residues. In this case, the decryption does
not give the desired result. If λ is chosen suﬃciently large (in practice 86), it never
happens. Figure 3 represents the algorithm for converting a basic GM ciphertext into
an AND-GM ciphertext without knowing either the secret key or the plaintext. It
can be easily shown that given two ciphertexts b and b′ encrypted using AND-GM
scheme, the component-wise product of b and b′ is an AND-GM encryption of b ∧ b′.
2.2.3 Threshold Cryptosystems
The traditional cryptosystems consider the case where there is one sender and one
receiver in which the sender encrypts a message with the public key of the receiver
and sends the resulted ciphertext to the receiver. The receiver then decrypts the
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ciphertext to obtain the plaintext. However, in some cases, the receiver is not an
individual but instead an organization, e.g. a company or a governmental agency [44].
Therefore, there is a need to a distributed scheme that has one public key but many
secret keys so that the decryption power is distributed between multiple receivers.
From the security viewpoint, the threshold cryptography aims to protect the secret
key by sharing it amongst n parties in such a way that a predetermined number of
parties, namely the threshold k, should collaborate to fully decrypt a message. Any
collaboration between fewer than k parties does not result in a complete decryption.
The benefit of a threshold scheme is increased security, because an adversary who
corrupts at most k − 1 parties gains no advantage in determining the secret key of
the system or in breaking the underlying cryptographic protocol. Some threshold
cryptosystem employs a trusted dealer to set up the public key and the secret key
and distribute the shares of the secret key between the parties (e.g. [45, 46]). The
dealer must be minimally trusted not to reveal the secret key and therefore represents
a single point of attack. Thus, it is often desirable to distribute the key-generation
phase among the parties which removes the trusted dealer and ensures no entity ever
knows the secret information [24,47–50].
The idea of utilizing threshold cryptosystems in the cloud computing was first
noticed by Gentry [51]. The problem is to design a computation- and communication-
eﬃcient multi-party protocol that allows n parties contribute inputs x1, . . . , xn respec-
tively and jointly evaluate f(x1, . . . , xn) securely. Gentry suggested using a Fully-
Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) scheme and a powerful cloud that carry out the
computational-intensive operations. The parties first run a multiparty protocol to
generate a joint public key for (an arbitrary) FHE scheme, together with a secret
sharing of the corresponding secret key (the i-th party gets the i-th share of the
common secret key). Once this is done, the parties encrypt their inputs using the
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common public key and have the cloud compute an encryption of the result. They
then run yet another MPC protocol to perform threshold decryption and recover the
result. Later, Asharov et. al [52] and Lo´pez-Alt et. al [53] used a similar idea to
develop eﬃcient FHE schemes for multi-party computations.
In this thesis, we employ two threshold cryptosystems without depending on
the trusted dealer: threshold Paillier [47] and threshold GM [24] cryptosystems. Nor-
mally, the threshold cryptosystems have two core algorithms: a distributed key gen-
eration, and a distributed decryption algorithm.
For the threshold GM cryptosystem [24], the distributed key generation al-
gorithm can be performed by executing the distributed RSA key-generation pro-
tocols of [49, 50]. Following execution of the key-generation protocol, each party
i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} obtains the GM modulus N = pq and the additive shares (pi, qi).
The public key will be calculated as N = (Σni=1pi) . (Σ
n
i=1qi) while none of the parties
know the factorization of N (i.e., p and q). Decryption of a ciphertext C proceeds
as follows: the party i outputs bi = C
(−pi−qi)/4 mod N . Parties publicly compute
b0 = C
(N−5)/4 mod N . Deciding whether C is a quadratic residue or not may be done
by computing b′ =
∏k
i=0 bi mod N . The decrypted bit is b = (1− b′)/2.
For the threshold Paillier cryptosystem [47], the distributed RSA key generation
protocol is executed so that each party obtains N = pq and the additive share (pi, qi).




N − (p1 + q1) + 1 i = 1
−(pi + qi) i > 1
such that
∑n
i=1 xi = φ(N). The parties then commit to the value xi by publish-
ing hi = g





hi − 1 mod N2 = gφ(n) − 1 mod N2
To decrypt the ciphertext c, each party Pi computes mi = c
xi mod N2. The











Yao’s classical millionaires’ problem [35] (or private integer comparison) involves two
parties who want to compare their wealth: they wish to know who is richer but do
not want to disclose any other information about their wealth to each other. More
formally, given two input values x and y, which are held as private inputs by two
parties, respectively. The problem is to securely evaluate the condition x > y without
exposing inputs.
Yao [35] first proposed such a protocol for the private comparison problem,
which is an instantiation of secure multiparty computation. Nevertheless, the cost of
the protocol is exponential in both time and space. Later, Yao [54] and Goldreich [55]
used the technique of scrambled circuits to solve the general multiparty computation
problem. By applying this technique to the greater than (GT) problem, the cost of the
resulting protocol in computation and communication is linear. On the other hand,
protocols for solving the GT problem directly are more eﬃcient (e.g. [25, 56–59]).
These protocols usually require a constant number of rounds.
In this thesis, we utilize Fischlin protocol [25] for private comparison. In Fischlin
protocol one of the parties acts as a server. In this setting, say, Alice knows the private
keys to open encryptions and Bob works over his input bits and Alice’s encrypted
input bits to produce some information that allows Alice to know the output of the
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comparison being evaluated. Fischlin protocol uses the homomorphic properties of
GM-encryptions scheme to compute an expression logically equivalent to
x > y ⇐⇒ ∨ni=1 (xi ∧ ¬yi ∧ ∧nj=i+1(xj = yj))
⇐⇒ ⊕ni=1 (xi ∧ ¬yi ∧ ∧nj=i+1 ¬(xi ⊕ yi))
and
x = y ⇐⇒ (∧ni=1(xi = yi))
⇐⇒ (∧ni=1 ¬(xi ⊕ yi))
where |x| = |y| = n. The protocol steps are depicted in Fig. 4.
2.3 Left-Balancing Binary Search Trees
A binary search tree is a binary tree where each node has two pointers to other nodes
(namely, left child and right child) and a key and satisfies the restriction that the key
in any node is larger than the keys in all nodes in its left subtree and smaller than
the keys in all nodes in its right subtree. A left-balancing binary search tree (i.e.
Complete binary trees) [60,61] is a binary search tree with two key properties: (i) all
levels except the bottommost are filled, and (ii) in the bottommost level, the nodes
are inserted from left to right. These trees provide an easy way to store a tree in an
array. The idea is that instead of explicitly storing pointers which point from a given
node to its child nodes, we use arithmetic to compute the index of child nodes. In
this scheme, the root node is stored in the position 1 in the array, and when a node
is stored in the position i in the array, the child nodes are stored in the positions
2i and 2i + 1. This method has the advantage that all nodes on a given level lie in
a consecutive block. In addition, left and right children are adjacent which should
make the scheme more cache friendly. The benefit of left-balancing binary search tree
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Figure 4: Fischlin Private Comparison Protocol [25]
Protocol GTE-F(x,y) λ: error parameter
Alice:
− generates public key pk = (N, z) for security parameter k.
− encrypts y bit-wise: Yi ← Epk(yi) for i = 1, ..., n.
− sends N , z, Y1, . . . , Yn to Bob.
Bob:
− encrypts input x bit-wise: Xi ← EPK(xi) for i = 1, ..., n
− computes clauses [xi = yi] = ¬(xi ⊕ yi):
for i = 1 to n compute ci = Xi . Yi . z mod N
− embeds ci into extended encryptions cANDi of λ elements:
for all i = 1, . . . , n sets cANDi := (c
AND
i,1 , . . . , c
AND
i,λ )
− embeds encryptions Xi and Y¯i of xi and ¬yi into encryptions XANDi and Y¯ ANDi
of λ elements:
for all i = 1, . . . , n sets XANDi := (X
AND
i,1 , . . . , X
AND
i,λ )
for all i = 1, . . . , n sets Y¯ ANDi := (Y¯
AND
i,1 , . . . , Y¯
AND
i,λ )
− computes terms [xi ∧ ¬yi∧nj=i+1 xj = yj]:











− sends Δ1 . . .Δn in randomly permuted order to Alice.
− randomly permutes the λ ciphertexts of c and sends to Alice.
Alice:
− receives n sequences Δ1 . . .Δn of λ GM-ciphertext and c from Bob.
− if there exists a sequence of λ quadratic residues in Δ then output x > y
else if c is a sequence of λ quadratic residues then output x = y
else output x < y
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is that the average cost of looking up an item is O(logN) where N in the number of
nodes in the tree.
In [61] constructing left-balancing binary search search trees is explained for
single dimensional as well as multidimensional data. To construct such a tree, we
calculate the largest number M in the form of M = 2n such that M ≤ N where N is
the number of nodes we wish to insert. The tree will holdM−1 elements on all levels
excluding the bottommost. The bottommost level holdsM elements divided between
M/2 in the left subtree and M/2 in the right subtree. We compute the remainder
R = N − (M − 1) and the data set is partitioned into two subsets based on the value
of R. If R ≤M/2
LT = (M − 2)/2 +R (1)
RT = (M − 2)/2 (2)
Otherwise, if R > M/2
LT = (M − 2)/2 +M/2 (3)
RT = (M − 2)/2 +R−M/2 (4)
where LT and RT denote the number of nodes on the left and the right subtrees,
respectively. This procedure is recursively executed on the resulted subsets to output
the tree.
Search on 1-Dimensional Binary Search Trees. Binary search trees are able to
support point search as well as range search. The point search aims to search for
all nodes with a given key k and return pointers to them if they exist and NULL,
otherwise. The algorithm of point search is represented in Figure 5 that takes the
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current root r and the key k as arguments. It uses a subroutine report(v), which
traverses the subtree rooted at node v and reports all the stored nodes. Note that
r.key denotes the key attribute of node r. The time complexity of Point-Search
is O(logN) on average and O(N) in the worst case [60], where N is the number of
nodes.
Figure 5: Point Search on Binary Search Trees [62]
Algorithm Point-Search (r, k)
if r == NULL
then return NULL
If k == r.key
then return Point-Search (r.left, k)
report (r)
return Point-Search (r.right, k)
If k < r.key
then return Point-Search (r.left, k)
else return Point-Search (r.right, k)
Similarly, the goal of a range search query is to find pointers to all nodes with
the key in the range [k1, k2]. The range search algorithm is shown in Figure 6 that
takes as arguments the current root r, the upper bound k1 and higher bound k2. The
time complexity of Range-Search is O(m + log n) where m is the number of nodes
in range [k1, k2] and 0 ≤ m ≤ n [62].
2.4 Multidimensional Indexing
A database index is a supplementary data structure used to access data from the
database eﬃciently. Data is indexed either directly by the values of one or more
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Figure 6: Range Search on Binary Search Trees [62]
Algorithm Range-Search (r, k1, k2)
if r == NULL
then return NULL
If r.key < k1
then return Range-Search (r.right, k1, k2)
If r.key > k2





attributes or by hashes (generally not cryptographic hashes) of those values. The at-
tributes used to define an index constitute the key. Indices are typically organized into
tree structures, such as k-Dimensional trees (kD-trees) where the database records
are stored in internal nodes as well as leaf nodes. kD-trees are multidimensional bi-
nary search trees where the key used diﬀers between levels. At each root, the keys
on the left subtrees are less than or equal to the key of the root. Similarly, nodes
on the right subtree have the key that is greater than or equal to the root. kD-trees
are used extensively as indices for multidimensional data (geographical, multimedia
and database). In databases, three basic types of multi-dimensional queries are con-
sidered [63]: exact matching queries (a.k.a. point search), partial matching queries
and range queries. An exact matching query searches a database to find objects
with specific attribute values. A partial matching query specifies only values for a
subset of the the attributes and searches for all records with the specified attribute
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values. Let N and d be the number of records and the number of attributes in the
database, respectively. The time complexity of the exact matching queries and the
partial matching queries is respectively O(d logN) and O(N1−s/d + k) where s is the
number of attributes, specified in the query (s < d) and k is the number of reported
records [62].
Range queries are the most general type of queries that specify a region with
which the records to be retrieved must intersect. Figure 7 shows the range search
algorithm on kD-trees [62]. It takes as input the root of kD-tree v and the query range
R. It uses a subroutine ReportSubtree(v), which traverses the subtree rooted at
node v and reports all the stored nodes. A query in a d dimensional tree storing N
records, can be performed in O(N1−1/d + k) time, where k is the number of reported
records [62].
Figure 7: Range Search on kD-Trees [62]
Algorithm kD-Tree Search(v,R)
if v is a leaf
then report v if it lies in R
else if v.left is fully contained in R
then ReportSubtree(v.left, R)
else if v.left intersects R
then kD-Tree Search(v.left, R)
else if v.right is fully contained in R
then ReportSubtree(v.right)
else if v.right intersects R




This chapter covers previous works related to this thesis. We begin by briefly re-
viewing the notion of Private Information Retrieval (PIR). Afterwards, we give an
overview of prior works aimed to make data access more expressive while protecting
privacy. We briefly highlight Basic Homomorphic Encryption (BHE) and Hybrid Ho-
momorphic Encryption (HHE), Transparent PIR (TransPIR) and SQL-enabled PIR
(SQL-PIR) and we will use these works as the basis of comparison with our proposed
protocols.
3.1 Private Information Retrieval
The notion of private information retrieval (PIR) was introduced by Chor, Goldreich,
Kushilevitz and Sudan [20] and has already received a lot of attention. The study of
PIR is motivated by the growing concerns about the user’s privacy when querying a
large commercial database.
The PIR problem consists of devising a communication protocol involving just
two parties, the server and the user, each having a secret input. The server’s secret
input is called the data string, an n-bit string B = b1b2 . . . bn. The user’s secret
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input is an integer i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. The protocol should enable the user to learn bi
in a communication-eﬃcient way and at the same time hide i from the database. A
natural extension of PIR is private block retrieval in which the n-bit data string is
considered to be composed of n
b
blocks, each of size b bits. The user’s objective is to
retrieve the i-th block from the database. A trivial solution to the PIR problem is
simply to ask the server for the whole database and look up the desired bit or block
on the user side. However this approach incurs excessive communication cost to the
server which is linear with respect to the number of bits to represent the database
records.
There are two main types of PIR: information-theoretic and computational. In
information-theoretic PIR [20], the server is unable to determine any information
about the client’s query even with unbounded computing power. In computational
PIR (cPIR) [21], the privacy of the query only needs to be guaranteed against servers
restricted to polynomial-time computations. A number of applications have been
proposed for PIR, including patent and pharmaceutical databases [64], online census
information [65], and real-time stock quotes [65].
A common assumption for PIR schemes is that the user knows the index or
address of the item to be retrieved. However, Chor et al. [39] proposed a way to access
data with PIR using keyword searches over three data structures: binary search tree,
Trie [66] and perfect hashing. They showed how the client can privately traverse
certain server-held data structures. Their solutions for binary search trees, upon
which we build our framework in Chapter 4, protect only the user privacy. They also
provide a solution for tries that is also server-private. The trie is a data structure
that stores the data of each node in a path from the root to the node, rather than the
node itself. A trie has a number of advantages over binary search trees such as faster
lookup and easy updating [67]. However, the trie data structure is not well suited
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in the database context because of the diﬃculty in handling range queries. Song et.
al. [68] also proposed a solution for the secure outsourcing of the single-dimensional
data (such as documents and emails) that protects the access privacy of the client and
the database confidentiality; however their approach ignores the data owner privacy.
The above mentioned techniques provide basic data access models, limited to
either retrieving a single bit or a block of bits using indices or textual keywords. This
property limits the deployment of PIR in complex systems storing structured data
sources such as relational databases. Therefore there is a need for a more expressive
data access model. Reardon et al. [69], Olumofin and Goldberg [10] and Wong et
al. [22] have considered this issue by proposing techniques for privacy-preserving SQL-
query processing but their approaches leak extra information about the database
beyond the query result.
3.1.1 TransPIR
Transparent PIR (TransPIR) [69] is among the first attempt to extend PIR to SQL.
TransPIR evaluates private relational queries with the goal of minimizing the com-
munication complexity. It uses PIR for data block retrieval from the database server,
whose function has been reduced to private block retrieval from the server.
In this system, relational algebra queries are translated into query plan by a
query processor. The query plan comprises of function calls executable by a virtual
database which is a component that maps relation information into PIR blocks. The
virtual database responds to this call by fetching the appropriate block from the server
based on the layout of the database. To reduce communication complexity, the indices
are constructed over the tables of database. The client then performs traditional
database functions (such as parsing and optimization) locally on her machine.
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The benefit of TransPIR is that the database server does not learn any infor-
mation even about the textual content of the user’s query. The drawbacks are poor
query performance because the database is unable to perform any optimization, and
the lack of interoperability with any existing relational database system.
3.1.2 BHE/HHE
Wang et al. [22] propose an algorithm which protects the privacy of client’s query
considering range and join queries. The query privacy is achieved through query
obfuscation. Homomorphic encryption and bucketization are the primitives utilized
in these approaches. To help a client to construct a private query, the server buck-
etizes the public database and sends the bucket summary to the client. The client
subsequently determines which bucket(s) contains the data of interest. To retrieve
the matching database records, Basic Homomorphic Encryption (BHE) and Hybrid
Homomorphic Encryption (HHE) algorithms have been proposed. BHE reveals noth-
ing about the private data and queries and requires a single round of communication
between the client and the server. However, it requires sending the entire database
records to the client for filtration that is linear in the number of records. To further
reduce the costs of BHE, HHE has been introduced. HHE trades oﬀ privacy by eﬃ-
ciency; the client selects a subset of buckets that include the buckets of interest and
computation is performed only on these subsets.
Note that BHE and HHE require frequent public-key homomorphic encryp-
tion/decryption which incurs computation cost to the both sides. This is specially a
major problem on the client side because it is typically a machine with limited com-
putation and communication capabilities. BHE provides perfect privacy, however the
communication overhead is roughly linear in the number of records. On the other
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hand, HHE achieves better eﬃciency (in terms of both communication and compu-
tation) by revealing a superset of buckets of interest. But it is also vulnerable to
certain type of attacks against curious database server; since the client discloses the
matching buckets, the server is able to tighten the extent of buckets. In this case,
the server can see the matching buckets and guess the client’s query even though the
buckets are hidden among others.
3.1.3 SQL-PIR
SQL-PIR [10] integrates PIR with SQL to protect the query privacy and enable data
retrieval from databases. The protection mechanism is based on the observation that
the shape of an SQL query is not private, but the constants supplied by the user is
private and must be protected. SQL-PIR considers some attributes to be sensitive
and it aims to hide the constants associated with these attributes.
The user sends a desensitized version of the original SQL query by removing
private constants. The database executes this public SQL query and generates ap-
propriate B+ indices [70] for each sensitive attribute to support further rounds of
interaction with the client. The B+ tree is a generalization of a binary search tree in
that a node can have more than two children.
The user subsequently performs a number of keyword-based PIR operations [39]
using the value of the sensitive attributes against the indices to obtain the result for
the query. Capabilities for dealing with complex queries is built on the user side.
In the case of existence of two or more sensitive attributes in the query predicate,
the user requests separate indices. The user will subsequently perform PIR keyword
search on each of indices and combine the partial result by set operations (union,
intersection) to obtain the final query result.
In this thesis, a similar notion of query privacy protection is utilized: the goal is
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to protect private constants incorporated in query predicate. SQL-PIR considers the
query privacy of client however it fails to protect data owner privacy. In particular
SQL-PIR reveals to the client, database records which are not relevant to the query.
Moreover, SQL-PIR reveals the entire textual shape of the query to the server in
particular the operands that combine the logical condition on attributes.
3.2 Privacy-Preserving Set Operations
Freedman et al. [71] provide a solution to solve the problem of data set intersection
for both the semi-honest and the malicious environments. The proposed protocol
enables two parties each holding a set of input to jointly compute the intersection of
their input sets without leaking any additional information. This protocol is based
on the representation of data sets as the roots of a polynomial. In this approach,
the client constructs a polynomial whose roots are her inputs and sends the homo-
morphic encryptions of the polynomial’s coeﬃcients to the server. The server uses
the homomorphic properties of the encryption system to evaluate the polynomial at
each of the database tuple and outputs the evaluation results to the client. The client
decrypts the results and checks for possible matches.
Kissner and Song [72] extended this framework to design a protocol for privacy-
preserving multiset operations. A privacy-preserving multiset operation considers
the problem of computing the union, intersection, and element reduction on n private
multisets from n users, such that each user only learns the resulted set. Similar
to [71], the multiset of each user is represented by a polynomial and operations on
polynomials lead to privacy-preserving multisets operations.
Private query processing on outsourced databases can be achieved by obtaining
the intersection of two private datasets where query constants are the client’s input
and the database records are the server’s input. Our proposed protocol is significantly
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diﬀerent from private intersection schemes because SQL queries are richer and more
complex compared to a simple set intersection. The private matching protocol is able
to answer exact matching queries on a single attribute whereas the proposed proto-
col in this thesis answers exact-matching and interval-matching queries on multiple
attributes.
3.3 Oblivious Keyword Search
Keyword search (KS) is a fundamental database operation. It assumes that each
database tuple is tagged with an appropriate keyword. It involves two parties: a
server, holding a database comprised of a set of records and their associated keywords,
and a client, who sends queries including keywords and receives the records associated
with these keywords. Oblivious keyword search protocols provide privacy for both
parties. It enable the client to search for the records associated with queried keyword
while hiding the queries from the database. Moreover, it provides server privacy by
preventing the clients from learning anything but the results of the queries.
In [73], Ogata and Kurosawa introduced the idea of oblivious keyword search
and proposed two protocols satisfying their definition. However, the communication
complexity of these protocols is linear in the database size. Freedman et al. [27]
provide more communication-eﬃcient single-round oblivious keyword protocols secure
against malicious users and semi-honest servers.
In [39] Chor et al. showed how the user can privately traverse data structures
held by a server. Their solutions for binary search trees provide only user privacy.
They also give a solution for tries that is server-private, as well. These techniques
yield useful PIR by keyword solutions for situations where the user wants to retrieve
a record stored under a known keyword. However, trie is not appropriate to handle
range queries.
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Keyword search protocols can be used to answer range queries by running a key-
word search on every value in the query range. However, these schemes are extremely
ineﬃcient in particular when the data is fairly sparse in the queried range.
3.4 Private Database Outsourcing
Private database outsourcing model was first introduced by Hacigumus et al. [11].
They considered protecting the database records of a client from an untrusted
database service providers. Most existing approaches in this category resort to data
encryption to protect the database confidentiality [74]. Although various techniques
have been proposed to protect the database hosted on the cloud server [12,16], they
cannot be adopted in this problem for several reasons. First, to evaluate the query on
the encrypted data, the client must encrypt the query by the same scheme and the
same key that are used by the data owner and send it to the cloud server. The cloud
server may then forward the encrypted query to the data owner, where the query can
be decrypted by her encryption key.
Second, a common approach in the existing research proposals is to send a
set of encrypted records to the client for filteration and further processing [11–19].
Therefore, the cloud server may reveal extra information beyond the query result to
the client. Thus, the proposed techniques for secure database outsourcing will not
protect the query privacy and the database privacy.
Recently, CryptDB [75] has been proposed that is built on the top of the exist-
ing relational database management systems (RDBMS) and protects the privacy of
database records in the cloud computing. The proposal employs various encryption
schemes to support all types of SQL queries over encrypted databases. It depends
on a fully trusted component, namely CryptDB, that maintains all the secret and
public keys and transforms the users’ SQL queries to a query that can be executed
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over encrypted records. CryptDB has low overhead on query execution time, how-
ever it requires a fully trusted component which is the single point of attack; if the
attacker can compromise CryptDB, she can decrypt the database records as well as
retrieving the query. The proposed protocol in this thesis makes no assumption about
existence of a trusted party; we consider all parties to be semi-honest adversary and
our objective is to protect the query privacy and database privacy in the presence of
non-trusted parties.
Instead of using encryption, Aggarwal et al. [76] proposed secret sharing to hide
database records from the adversaries. This approach requires multiple non-colluding
servers to keep the share of each database record. However, the assumption of having
servers, unaware from each other is strong in the real world. In addition, this approach
has significant communication and computation overhead since for executing each
query, the the shares of the database must be retrieved to reconstruct the database.
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3.5 Privacy-Preserving Data Mining
Data mining and knowledge discovery in databases are new research areas that inves-
tigate the extraction of previously unknown patterns from large amounts of data. Pri-
vacy preserving data mining (PPDM) [23,77–79] is a novel research direction in data
mining and cryptography, where two or more parties owning confidential databases
wish to run a data mining algorithm on the union of their databases without revealing
sensitive information of individuals. In particular, although the parties realize that
combining their data has some mutual benefit, none of them is willing to reveal its
database to any other party. In this case, we need to consider a distributed computing
scenario, rather than a scenario where all data is gathered in a central server, which
then runs the algorithm on all data.
The term privacy-preserving data mining was first introduced by Agrawal and
Srikant [77] and Lindell and Pinkas [23]. These papers considered two fundamental
problems of PPDM: privacy-preserving data collection and mining a data set parti-
tioned across several private enterprises. Agrawal and Srikant devised an algorithm
that allows multiple parties to contribute their private records for eﬃcient centralized
data mining while limiting the disclosure of their values. On the other hand, Lindell
and Pinkas invented a cryptographic protocol based on secure multiparty computa-
tion for decision tree construction over a data set horizontally partitioned between
two parties. The main disadvantage of cryptographic PPDM is that these approaches
are diﬃcult to scale when more than a few parties are involved. Moreover, it does
not address the question of whether the disclosure of the final data mining result may
breach the privacy of individual records.
Other research works in the literature that influence the development of PPDM
include privacy preserving classification [80–82], privacy-preserving association rule
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mining [83–85], privacy-preserving clustering [86–88], privacy-preserving Bayes clas-
sifier/Bayesian network [89, 90], and privacy-preserving multivariate statistical anal-
ysis [91, 92].
Private database search is considered as an integral part of PPDM. In particu-
lar, the result of private aggregate queries, executed by symmetric-private database
search protocols, are used as the input to data mining algorithm to extract informa-
tion and/or patterns. In other words, the protocols proposed in this thesis can be
used as subprotocols in PPDM to preserve the data miner’s query privacy as well as
database records privacy. Therefore, combination of PPDM and symmetric-private
database search enables the data miner (i.e., client) to mine the published sanitized
data by posing private SQL aggregate queries that provides privacy for data miner
and database owner (by symmetric-private database search) as well as individual
privacy (by PPDM). In other words, PPDM is a complement to symmetric-private
database search that provides individuals privacy.
3.6 Privacy-Preserving Data Publishing
Privacy-preserving data publishing (PPDP) provides methods and tools for publishing
useful information while preserving data privacy. In particular identity of individu-
als, whose records exist in database, must not be identified from published data.
Recently, PPDP has received considerable attention in research communities, and
many approaches have been proposed for diﬀerent data publishing scenarios.
A typical scenario for PPDP consists of three phases: in the data collection
phase, the data publisher collects data from record owners (e.g., patients). In the
data sanitization the collected data are sanitized by the data publisher. In the data
publishing phase, the data publisher releases the sanitized data to data miners or to
the public, who will then mine the published data to extract useful information. In
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order to limit the possibility that an individual could be identified from the released
data, a combination of sanitization techniques are used including generalization [93–
95], suppression [95,96], swapping [97,98], and randomization [77].
PPDP diﬀers from our work in several major ways: PPDP focuses on techniques
for publishing the data while protecting the privacy of the record owners. In contrast,
symmetric-private database search aims to execute queries on the database while
protecting the privacy of the client’s query and the database records. In fact, it is
expected that symmetric-private SQL/keyword search queries are executed on the
published data, produced by the PPDP techniques so that the privacy of all parties
(the database owner, the record owner and the client) is protected.
It should be noted that there is a significant body of works on distributed pri-
vacy preserving data integration, aggregation, and mining (e.g. constructing decision
trees [23], computing association rules, classification and clustering [13, 85, 99], and
diﬀerential privacy [100–102]). These works provide a rich and useful set of privacy
preserving tools for the purpose of protecting the privacy of records in databases.
More precisely, these works aim to protect the record owner from being identified
through query result [103]. They allow a trusted server to release obfuscated an-
swers to aggregate queries to avoid leaking information about any specific record in
the database. Such works can be considered to have a diﬀerent goal and model and
can be added as a front end in the proposed protocol to provide privacy-preserving




Search in Cloud Computing
In this chapter, we present SQL query processing protocols that preserve both the data
privacy and the query privacy among the data owner, the clients, and the cloud server.
These protocols help the clients to keep their sensitive information, contained in the
SQL query, from being leaked. Moreover, the sensitive information of individuals in
database and database records are protected against the clients that can be modeled
as semi-honest adversaries.
4.1 Introduction
Most software systems request sensitive information from clients and construct a
query from the filled form, but privacy concerns can make the client unwilling to
provide such information. Thus, development of practical schemes, that protect
the query privacy of the clients, is crucial in important application domains like
patent databases, pharmaceutical databases, online censuses, real-time stock quotes,
location-based services, and Internet domain registration. For instance, the current
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process for Internet domain name registration requires a client to first disclose the
name for the new domain to an Internet domain registrar. Subsequently, the registrar
could then register the new domain and thereby resell the domain at the higher price
to the client. Therefore, many clients find it unacceptable to disclose the sensitive
information contained in their queries to the server [10].
Basic techniques in privacy-preserving SQL-query processing place no restric-
tion on the information leaked about other items in the database, which are not of
interest to the client [10,22,69]. However, an extension of these techniques adds that
restriction by insisting that a client learns only the result of her query. The restriction
is crucial in situations where the database privacy is equally of concern.
The problem addressed by Symmetric Private Information Retrieval (SPIR)
[28] is to provide a client with the means to retrieve data from a database without
the database (or the database administrator) learning any information about the
particular item that was retrieved. The rudimentary data access model of SPIR is
one of the hindering factors in deploying SPIR-based query processing model. These
models are limited to retrieving a single bit or a block of bits in a specific index.
There is therefore a need for an extension of SPIR to a more expressive model that is
suitable for retrieval from relational databases. In this chapter, we explore the query
processing model on relational database that provides data privacy and query privacy
among the clients, the data owner and the cloud server.
We consider a cloud computing environment that stores an outsourced database.
The main entities in Database-as-a-Service (DBaaS) are individuals, a database
owner, clients and a cloud server. In this thesis, individuals refer to someone who
owns the information e.g., a patient who has medical records and wants the data
owner to store her data while preserving her privacy. The database owner refers to
someone who collects the information from individuals and outsources her database
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to a third-party service provider namely a cloud server, e.g., a hospital manager who
collects information about the patients. The cloud server would be given the ability
to store the database and the capability to answer certain types of queries issued
by the clients. The client is generally someone who can perform search over the
databases stored on the cloud server. An illustrative example for the system model

















Figure 8: System Model in DBaaS
This chapter deals with constructing protocols for privately answering aggregate
queries in such a way that the privacy of the clients and the database owner is
preserved. Roughly speaking, a protocol is client-private if the cloud server and the
database owner learn nothing about the constants in the client’s query and query
results. Similar to [10], we presume that the shape or textual content of SQL queries
is not private, but the constants the client supplies in the WHERE clause are private,
and must be protected. Our approach to preserve query privacy over a relational
database is based on hiding all the constants included in queries.
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Similarly, a protocol is server-private if the client learns no additional informa-
tion about the server’s database beyond the correct answer to her query. A protocol
which is both client-private and server-private is called symmetrically-private. The
symmetrically-private protocols are important in the applications where the privacy
of database records is an important concern such as in the healthcare systems.
4.2 Threat Model and Adversary Capabilities
We consider the clients, the cloud server, the database owner and any other attackers
who can view the data retrieved from the server and monitor activities on the client
and the server as adversaries. We assume that the adversaries are semi-honest: they
follow the protocol’s steps correctly (i.e. they are not malicious), but they are free
to infer clients’ queries and database owners’ private data. The proposed protocol is
secure at the presence of semi-honest adversaries.
4.3 Symmetrically-Private Keyword Search
Consider a database owner D who owns a raw data set D. To reduce the workload of
the data owner in answering queries, the data owner delegates the tasks of database
storage and query processing to a cloud server S. The cloud server may not be
fully trusted by the data owner or may be susceptible to attacks by malicious parties
(both internal and external). Therefore, the data owner needs to encrypt the database
records before outsourcing them to the cloud server. The client C wants to execute
aggregate queries on the encrypted database stored on the server without disclosing
the constant in her queries as well as the query result. The server S wants to answer
the client’s query without disclosing any records that are not part of the result.
In a naive approach, the client performs a linear search on the server’s database
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by following the millionaire protocol [35, 104] to evaluate the SQL query at each
database entry. However, this approach incurs excessive communication overhead
which is linear in the number of records in the database due to the linear search. To
reduce the communication overhead, the data owner organizes the database as a bi-
nary search tree, creates an encrypted database from this tree using the Goldwasser-
Micali (GM) encryption [42] and outsources the encrypted database to the cloud
server. The client’s objective is to traverse the resulted tree represented by the en-
crypted database to obtain the query result. This can be achieved by exploiting the
homomorphic properties of the GM encryption using Fischlin’s protocol for private
comparison and by utilizing SPIR for private information retrieval. Tree search can
considerably reduce communication and computation overhead.
In this section, we propose a protocol that executes keyword search queries on a
database on the cloud server side. It consists of three steps: (i) tree construction and
database encryption, (ii) oblivious tree search and payload retrieval (iii) query result
decryption. The Symmetrically-Private Keyword Search (SP-KS) protocol takes as
inputs the following:
− The database which consists of N pairs {(ki, pi)}i∈[N ] where ki denotes the
keyword and pi represents the payload (database record) owned by S. We
assume without loss of generality, that all ki’s are distinct.
− A search word w owned by C. C obtains pi if there is i such that ki = w or a
special symbol ⊥, otherwise.
In the following, we elaborate the basic steps of SP-KS protocol that preserves
the privacy of both the client and the data owner. The proposed protocol improves
over previous research proposals in this domain with less communication and compu-
tation on the client but incurs more computation cost on the server.
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4.3.1 Tree Construction and Database Encryption
The data owner defines L =
√
N bins, where N denotes the number of records in
the database. She maps N pairs into the L bins using a random, publicly-known
hash function H with a range of size L. Therefore, the record (ki, pi) is mapped to
the bin H(ki). For each bin j, the data owner sorts the assigned pairs according to
the keyword. Afterwards, the data owner employs the algorithm explained in Section
2.3 to construct a left-balancing binary search tree Tj for each bin j depending on
keyword. The resulted Tj’s are traversed to generate the database Aj. Later, Aj’s
are concatenated to form a single database A that contains the entire records. To
store the roots of the trees, an index array I with length L is created such that I[j]
contains the root index of the tree Tj in the database A.
Note that index-based database A contains database records in cleartext. To
outsource A to the cloud server, the data owner must encrypt the database pairs.
For this purpose, the data owner generates two public keys PKPL and PKGM for the
Paillier cryptosystem [26] and the threshold Goldwasser-Micali (GM) [42] cryptosys-
tem, respectively. The database owner makes use of Paillier encryption to encrypt
the payloads while threshold GM encryption is used to encrypt keywords bit by bit.
The database owner computes the secret key SKGM of GM cryptosystem. The secret
key SKGM (factors of the public key PKGM) are then distributed among the existing
clients as detailed by Katz and Yung [24]. At the end of this step, the database owner
outsources the encrypted index-based dataset A to the cloud server and publishes the
public keys to all clients.
Example 1. The data owner wants to outsource the dataset shown in Table 2. Sup-
pose that the first column is the keyword and the second column indicates the associated
payload. The original table has N = 8 records and consequently the number of bins
is
√
N ≈ 3. We define the public hash function as H(x) = x mod 3 + 1. The
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assigned records to each bin, sorted according to the Age attribute is represented in
Figure 9. For each bin, the left-balancing binary search tree is generated as explained
in Section 2.3. The resulted left-balancing binary search trees are shown in Figure
10. afterwards, each tree is traversed to generate a database. The resulted datasets
are concatenated to construct the index-based database shown in Table 3. To out-
source the index-based database to the cloud server, the payloads ( values of the Job
attribute) is encrypted by Paillier cryptosystem whereas the keywords are encrypted
by the threshold GM cryptosystem. The outsourced database is presented in Table 4.
In addition, the data owner constructs an array I that contains the root indexes of
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Figure 9: Generated Bins
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Figure 10: Left-Balancing Binary Search Trees
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4.3.2 Oblivious Tree Search and Payload Retrieval
In order to execute keyword search (KS) queries, the client needs to traverse the
tree stored on the cloud server side. Traversing a tree is performed by retrieving
the root’s keyword-payload pair, comparing the search word with the root’s keyword,
and terminating the search or determining a new root. Since, the database on the
cloud server is encrypted by the GM cryptosystem, the comparison must be done on
ciphertexts instead of plaintexts. To compare the ciphertexts, we rely on the Fischlin
protocol. The Fischlin protocol takes as the inputs the bit representation of two
integers, encrypted by the GM cryptosystem, and outputs an encrypted ciphertext
sequence. The decryption of the output ciphertext sequence determines which input
is greater.
To utilize the Fischlin protocol, the client encrypts her search word w by the
data owner’s public key using the GM cryptosystem and sends it to the server. For
each pair {(EGM(ki), EPL(pi))}i∈[A] in the database, the cloud server executes one
instantiation of Fischlin protocol GTE-F detailed in Chapter 2.2.4 using the encrypted
search word EGM(w) and the encrypted keyword EGM(ki) as the inputs. The output
of this protocol is the ciphertext sequences Δi and ci that will be stored in a new
database T together with the encrypted payloads EPL(pi) using the Paillier scheme.
More precisely, the content of the i-th tuple of the database T (T [i]) is the result
of comparing the client’s search word w with the i-th keyword of the index-based
database A in the encrypted form together with the encrypted payloads EPL(pi)
using the Paillier scheme. Afterwards, the database T is made public to the client for
the query execution.
Example 2. (Continued from Example 1) Suppose that the client’s search word w
equals 28. The client encrypts w bit-by-bit using the data owner’s public key and sends
the ciphertext sequence to the server. The server executes Fischlin’s protocol GTE-F to
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calculate ciphertext sequences Δ and c for each encrypted keyword in the outsourced
database ( Table 4) stored in the cloud server. The resulted ciphertext sequences along
with the corresponding Paillier encrypted payloads are stored in the table T (Figure









Table 6: Table T for SP-KS
To execute keyword search queries eﬃciently, the client needs to traverse the
generated binary search trees. Note that the client needs only to traverse the tree of
the bin in which w could exist. To obtain the tree root of this bin, the client calculates
H(w) which determines the bin as well as the index of the tree root in the array I.
Both parties run SPIR such that the server’s input is the array I and the clients’s
input is H(w). SPIR guarantees that the client learns I[H(w)] and the server learns
nothing. After yielding the tree root for the bin that the client is interested in, the
client initiates the search by retrieving the content of tree root in array T . The client
extracts Δ and c from the retrieved item. As explained before, Δ and c indicate
the result of comparing the search word w with the tree root’s keyword in encrypted
form. Therefore, by decrypting these ciphertext sequences, the client can evaluate the
comparison result. Based on the comparison result, the search is continued on the left
or on the right subtree by updating the root index. Additionally, the client retrieves
the index of the tree root of the next bin to obtain the current bin’s boundaries. To
fully understand the scheme, we need to detail the following points.
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− Retrieving the root data by SPIR. The database T contains the result of com-
paring the client’s keyword with each record in the database. To traverse the
tree of the bin that the client is interested in, the client needs to know the result
of comparing the search word w with the root’s keyword. To protect mutual
privacy of the client and the server, both parties run SPIR to provide the client
with Δ and c generated for the bin root.
− Ciphertext decryption. The ciphertext sequences Δ and c are generated by
Fischlin’s protocol for private comparison. These ciphertext sequences are en-
crypted by the data owner’s public key under the threshold GM cryptosystem.
Therefore, decryption of Δ and c is performed by the participation of a specific
number of active clients. Each active client, that has been contacted by the
querier client, partially decrypts the ciphertexts Δ and/or c by her share of se-
cret key and sends the share of plaintext to the querier client. The querier client
then aggregates the partial decryption results to obtain the actual plaintext.
− Updating the root index. Initially, the relative index of current root in the tree is
i = 1 and the oﬀset of all records in the bin H(w) (with respect to the first array
element in the database T ) is (I[H(w)]− 1). Therefore, the sum of the index i
and the oﬀset (I[H(w)]−1) determines the actual (global) index (i′) of the tree
root in the array T (i′ = i+I[H(w)]−1). To search the tree, the client retrieves
the data stored in the index (i′ = i+ I[H(w)]− 1) in the array T . If the search
word is less than the root’s keyword, the search must be performed on the left
subtree. The left subtree will be rooted at position (2i+I[H(w)]−1). Similarly,
if the search word is greater than root’s keyword, the search is continued on the
right subtree by updating index i′ to (2i+1+ I[H(w)]− 1). If the search word
is equal to the root’s keyword, the encrypted payload is stored on the client side
as the query result for decryption and the tree search is terminated. Otherwise
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if i′ > I[(H(w)+1) mod L] or i′ > N , the client concludes that the search word
does not exist in the database.
Example 3. (Continued from Example 2) Client’s search word is 28 (w=28). The
client calculates H(28) = 28 mod 3+ 1 = 2. Therefore, the client needs to search bin
2. To traverse the tree associated with bin 2, the client and the server engage in SPIR
to retrieve the numbers at index 2 and at index 3 of the array I (i.e., I(2) and I(3)).
SPIR outputs I[2] = 3 and I[3] = 7 to the client which are the indexes of trees’ roots
in T . Therefore, the oﬀset is I[2] = 2 and the global index i′ can take the values 3, 4,
5 and 6. Initially, i = 1 and i′ = 1+2 = 3. At each step if i′ > 6 or i′ > 8 the search
is terminated. Otherwise, The client retrieves T [i′] = T [3] = {Δ49, c49, EPL(Writer)}.
The client then forwards {Δ49, c49} to a specific number of online participants (i.e.,
clients) for decryption. The participants calculate their share of plaintext and send it
to the client. The client then computes the plaintexts D(c) and D(Δ) and concludes
that the root’s keyword is greater than w. Therefore, the client continues searching on
the left subtree. Afterwards, the client updates i = 2 ∗ 1 = 2 and i′ = i+ I[2]− 1 = 4.
Similarly, the client retrieves T [4] = {Δ28, c28, EPL(Dancer)} from the cloud server
and forwards it to the participants for decryption. The resulted plaintexts D(c) and
D(Δ) indicate that the root’s keyword is equal to the search word and accordingly the
search is terminated.
4.3.3 Query Result Decryption
After the client obtains the query result (payload), she communicates with the data
owner to decrypt it. To prevent the data owner from learning the query result, the
client obfuscates the query result. Payload obfuscation is performed by generating a
random number R, encrypting it by the data owner’s public key and multiplying it by
the encrypted payload to obtain E(pi+R). The obfuscated encrypted payload is sent
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to the data owner for decryption. The data owner returns the obfuscated decrypted
payload to the client and the client subtracts R to obtain the actual payload.
4.4 Symmetrically-Private SQL Search
In Section 4.3, we presented a protocol that allows a client to securely execute her
keyword search queries over a database, stored on the cloud server side. In this
section, we extend the idea to the SQL queries so that the client will be able to
securely evaluate her SQL query and obtain the query result. The client’s input
is an aggregate SQL query that consists of exact-matching and interval-matching
predicates on multiple attributes combined with logical operators (AND/OR/NOT).
The server’s input is a relational encrypted database. In the following, the basic
steps of the Symmetrically-Private SQL Search (SP-SQL) protocol are described.
Our approach to preserve the query privacy is based on hiding constants contained in
the query predicates. The basic assumption is that the shape of SQL queries is not
private, but the constants provided by clients must be protected from other parties.
Moreover, the only piece of information that is revealed to the client is the query
result. Handling SQL queries are generally more complex than KS queries in the
sense that they usually contain more than one attribute. In addition, answering SQL
queries requires supporting interval matching and exact matching in the predicate.
4.4.1 Tree Construction
The data owner organizes the database D as a left-balancing k-Dimensional tree (kD-
tree), encrypts and stores it on the server. The client sends the sanitized version of
SQL queries by replacing constants in the predicate by their corresponding encryption.
The server generates the required data for executing the client’s query and the client
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executes the query by traversing the kD-tree in an oblivious manner. To construct
left-balancing kD-tree, we use a similar approach that is described in Section 2.3.
Assume that the database has n attributes and the corresponding attributes are
sorted according to a pre-specified order. At each tree level d, the attribute Aa
(a = d mod n+ 1) is chosen and the data owner sorts the records based on Aa. Note
that if there exist multiple records with the same value for attribute Aa, the data
owner sorts them with respect to the other attributes in the sorted sequence, namely
Aa+1, . . . , An. Let LT and RT denote the number of records in the left subtree and
the right subtree, respectively. Then, LT and RT are computed and the records are
partitioned into two subsets through the (LT + 1)-th record. All records on the left
of the (LT + 1)-th record constitute the left subtree and the remaining records will
construct the right subtree. The procedure is executed recursively until there exists
only one record. The resulted tree is then traversed and stored in an index-based
database named A. In order to employ Fischlin protocol, the outsourced database
is encrypted by the GM encryption, using the data owner’s public key. In addition,
the client wants to execute aggregate queries (sum, avg, count) on the outsourced
database. To support these types of queries, all columns are also encrypted by the
Paillier cryptosystem using the public key of the data owner.
Example 4. Suppose that the data owner wants to outsource Table 7 to the server.
The attributes are sorted as Job, Age and Salary. At each level, LT and RT are com-
puted and the records is partitioned according to the chosen attribute. For instance,
in the first level, attribute Job will be chosen; N = 10 and M = 8 which resulted in
R = 3, LT = 6 and RT = 3. To discover the record of the root, the records are sorted
with respect to the selected attribute (i.e., Job). Therefore, the record (Lawyer,49,44)
will be chosen as the root in the first level. The resulted left-balancing kD-tree is
represented in Figure 11. The index-based database named A is also shown in Table
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Figure 11: Left-Balancing kD-tree
8. The outsourced database, stored by the cloud server, has 6 attributes which are
EGM(Job), EGM(Age), EGM(Salary), EPL(Job), EPL(Age), and EPL(Salary).
4.4.2 Query Sanitization
To execute a SQL query on the outsourced database, the client sanitizes the SQL
query by replacing the constants contained in the predicate by their GM encryption
using the public key of the data owner. For example, if the client’s SQL query is
SELECT SUM(Salary) FROM D WHERE Age < 50 AND Job = ′Dancer′
The sanitized query will be
SELECT SUM(Salary) FROM D WHERE Age < EGM(50) AND Job = EGM(“Dancer”)
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4.4.3 Oblivious Tree Traversal
Sanitized queries are sent to the server to generate the ciphertext sequences Δ and
c, that are the output of the Fischlin protocol and are required to compare two
ciphertexts. Similar to SP-KS protocol, we need to generate the columns of the
database T that are required to evaluate the query predicate. The generated columns
depend on the type of the query, as follow:
− Interval matching or exact matching. If an attribute appears in either an interval
matching or an exact matching predicate, a column is added to the database
T that contains the ciphertext sequence Δ generated by Fischlin’s protocol for
private comparison. In the case of exact matching, another column that contains
the ciphertext sequence c is added. These two columns are generated from the
encrypted constants in the predicate and from the corresponding encrypted
column in the relational database.
− sum and avg queries. The Paillier encryption of the attribute, targeted by the
aggregate function, is added to the database T .
− max and min queries. The GM encryption of the attribute, targeted by the
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aggregate function, is added to the database T .
− count queries. No additional column is required.
Example 5. (Continued from Example 4) Consider the following sanitized SQL query
SELECT SUM(Salary) FROM D WHERE Age < EGM(50) AND Job = EGM(“Dancer
′′)
The generated database T is represented in Table 9.
Table 9: Table T for SP-SQL
Salary Age Job-CMP Job-EQU
EHOM(49) Δ44 ΔLawyer cLawyer
EHOM(35) Δ31 ΔEngineer cEngineer
EHOM(80) Δ55 ΔLawyer cLawyer
EHOM(44) Δ28 ΔDancer cDancer
EHOM(70) Δ50 ΔEngineer cEngineer
EHOM(30) Δ50 ΔWriter cWriter
EHOM(35) Δ60 ΔWriter cWriter
EHOM(37) Δ30 ΔDancer cDancer
EHOM(60) Δ29 ΔEngineer cEngineer
EHOM(60) Δ40 ΔDancer cDancer
Initially, the search begins with the tree root at index i = 1 of the database
T . At each iteration, the client retrieves the corresponding record of the current
root by SPIR. The retrieved record contains the ciphertext sequences Δ and c (to
support comparison) and the Paillier-encrypted column (to prepare the query result).
If the current root is a leaf node (i.e., its left child does not exist (2i > N)) and it
satisfies the conditions, it is reported as part of the query result and stored by the
client for further processing. Exact matching predicates are evaluated by testing the
ciphertext sequence c; if all ciphertexts in the sequence c are quadratic residue, the
root is reported as the answer and the search is continued on both the left and the
right subtrees. Otherwise, the ciphertext sequence Δ is examined to determine the
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search path: if there exist at least one λ sequence of quadratic residue in Δ, the
search will be continued on the right subtree since the queried records have greater
value than the root. Otherwise, the left subtree is searched and the index i is updated
accordingly in both cases.
Range search over kD-tree is performed in a similar way; if the boundaries of
the left (resp. right) subtree is fully contained in the query region, the entire records
in the left (resp. right) subtree are reported as the query result. Otherwise, if the
boundaries of the left (resp. right) subtree intersects with the query space, search is
continued on the left (resp. right) subtree by updating index to 2i (resp. 2i+1). All
the comparisons are performed using Fischlin protocol and examining the output.
Example 6. (Continued from Example 5) The query region is Age × Job : [0 −
50] × “Dancer′′. The client starts from the root by setting i = 1. The output of
SPIR is the tuple (EHOM(49) ,Δ44 , cLawyer). The client decrypts Δ44 and cLawyer and
finds out that the tuple does not satisfy query predicates and the root value for the
Job attribute is greater than Dancer. Since at the first level, the records are sorted
according to Job attribute, the client concludes that the right subtree does not have
any intersection with the query region, but the left subtree does. Therefore, index i is
updated to 2 and the tuple (EHOM(35), Δ31 , cEngineer) is retrieved. The retrieved tuple
does not satisfy the condition, but its Age’s attribute value is less than 50. Therefore,
the client needs to perform search on both subtrees, recursively. At next iteration,
i = 4. The retrieved tuple indicates matching. Since the records are sorted according
to Salary and there is no condition in the WHERE clause associated with it, the client
needs to perform search on both subtrees recursively. By performing range search over













4.4.4 Query Result Decryption
The last step is to decrypt the query result while hiding it from the cloud server,
the data owner and the other clients. Note that, the query result is encrypted by
the data owner public key. Therefore, the client has to communicate with the data
owner to decrypt the result. Sending the query result in cleartext jeopardizes the
client privacy. Therefore the client must obfuscate the result to make it invisible to
data owner. The obfuscation depends on the type of the aggregate function as follow:
− count: the cardinality of query result reflects the exact value the client expects.
− sum: the client projects the records (that satisfy the query conditions) over
the attribute targeted by the sum function. She then multiplies the resulted
attribute values to capture the encrypted sum. She then generates a random
number R and encrypts it by the data owner’s public key (EHOM(R)). Then the
client multiplies the encrypted random number by the encrypted sum to obtain
the obfuscated sum, i.e., EHOM(Sum) × EHOM(R) = EHOM(Sum + R). The client
sends obfuscated sum to the data owner. The data owner decrypts the noisy
sum to obtain R + Sum and sends it back to client. The client, in its turn,
subtracts the noise R that leads to the query result.
− max,min: the client projects the records (that satisfy the query conditions)
over the attribute targeted by the max/min function. She then executes the
maximum algorithm on the ciphertexts using Fischlin protocol: the client picks
up the first value as the current maximum (resp. minimum). She then compares
the current encrypted maximum (resp. minimum) with the other values; if the
output of Fischlin indicates that the current maximum (resp. minimum) is
less than (resp. greater than) the examined value, the current maximum (resp.
minimum) is updated. Afterwards, the client generates a random number R
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and encrypt it bit by bit using GM-cryptosystem and the data owner’s public
key (EGM(Max)). She then find the component-wise modular multiplication of
the current encrypted maximum/minimum with the encrypted random number
to obtain the obfuscated maximum (resp. minimum) (i.e., EGM(Max).EGM(R) =
EHOM(Max⊕R)). The clients sends the obfuscated maximum (resp. minimum)
to k other clients for decryption and receives Max ⊕ R (resp. Min ⊕ R). To
retrieve the query result, the client XORes the obfuscated query result with R
to derive the actual maximum (resp. minimum).
Note that avg queries can be answered by executing count and sum queries and
dividing the result of the sum by the count.














the Salary attribute and multiplies them to obtain EHOM(60+ 37+ 44) = EHOM(151).
The client then generates a random number R and encrypts it by the data owner
public key PKPL to produces E(R). She then multiplies the encrypted sum by E(R)
and sends the result to the data owner for decryption. The data owner decrypts the
ciphertext and returns 151 +R to the client. The client simply subtracts R to obtain
the query result.
4.4.5 Improved Protocol
The presented protocol is the natural extension of the SPKS protocol to multidi-
mensional data in order to perform search over relational databases. The proposed
SP-SQL protocol provides absolute privacy for all parties in the environment; however
PIR protocols have been widely used which are deemed to be impractical for real-
world applications [105]. In this section, we step back from absolute privacy in favor
of eﬃciency and propose a protocol which does not make use of SPIR protocols. The
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improved approach relies on the cloud server to perform the search on the encrypted
datasets, instead of the clients. In this case, the client sanitizes the query and sends
it to the cloud server. The cloud server conducts the search on the encrypted records
by traversing the tree; the server privately evaluates the record in the tree root in
the same manner of the basic SP-SQL. To do so, the cloud server communicates with
the clients to perform decryption. Based on the result of comparison, the search is
continued on the left and/or the right subtree.
The improved SP-SQL does not require to use SPIR. It also shifts the burden
of searching from the querying client to the cloud server. The drawback is that the
cloud server finds out how many records satisfy the conditions in the SQL query,
but the constants in the query and the database records would be kept confidential
from the cloud server. Nonetheless, there are some application settings in which the
cloud server may be at least partially trusted in the sense that leaking the number of
records would not jeopardize the query privacy of the clients.
4.5 Security and Complexity Analysis
In this section, we will provide the security analysis of SP-KS and SP-SQL proto-
cols. The security of the protocols relies on the security of the implementation of the
underlying multiparty computation (MPC) primitives including symmetric private
information retrieval and private integer comparison. Moreover, the output of each
secure MPC primitive is the input to another secure MPC primitive. For instance,
the output of SPIR is the ciphertext sequences Δ and c which will be the input to
the private integer comparison protocol. Therefore, according to the Composition
Theorem [38], the tree traversal protocol is secure; the the cloud server does not learn
anything about the constants in the query because the client encrypts them. More-
over, SPIR guarantees that the cloud server does not know which node is currently
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visited by the client; the client also does not obtain any information about the other
items in the database and the retrieved item (which is the ciphertext sequences Δ
and c) do not reveal any information about the database records [25].
Query result decryption step is also secure in the sense that the client obfuscates
the query result by a random number. Therefore, when the database owner (in the
case of sum,avg) or the clients (in the case of max,min) decrypt the query result, they
cannot learn any information about the query result from the obfuscated plaintext.
4.5.1 Possible Attacks and Mitigations
The mentioned security analysis is valid while the parties do not collude. In this
section, we will study the possible attacks resulted from the collusion between diﬀerent
parties.
The threshold decryption will be compromised if the number of colluding clients
under the control of an adversary exceeds the threshold k. The threshold decryption
is required when the querier client wants to decrypt ciphertext sequences Δ and c. In
this case, the adversary does not learn any information about the plaintexts that are
compared. Instead, she can only understand if the database record at the root satisfies
the query condition(s) or not. However, the colluding clients are oblivious about the
root of the subtrees, visited by the client. In addition, the client needs to engage in the
threshold GM decryption to decrypt obfuscated minimum and maximum. Note that
the query result has been obfuscated to prevent the colluding clients from recovering
the query result.
The collusion can also occurs between the cloud server and the client adver-
saries. In this case, the database stored on the cloud server side can be recovered
by combining the secret keys of the client adversaries and decrypting the records.
However in practice, we can lower the risk to an acceptable level by implementing
63
other mechanisms. One possible solution is to store the client keys in smart cards
(or other tamper resistant devices) as proposed in [106]. Another possible solution is
to increase the threshold k such that the attackers are not able to compromise too
many patients. Despite simplicity, this mechanism has two disadvantages: First, it
will decrease the system’s availability: as the number of required online data owners
increases, it is more unlikely that they are online to perform decryption. Second,
it will increase the communication cost on the party who is searching the database
because she needs to communicate with more parties for decryption. Therefore, there
should be a trade-oﬀ between availability-security and eﬃciency by choosing a proper
value for k.
A possible threat to the query privacy of the client, is that the cloud server
may forward the sanitized query to the data owner. As mentioned before, the con-
stants in the sanitized query have been encrypted with the data owner’s public key.
Therefore, if the data owner and the cloud server collude, the data owner can decrypt
the constants and find out what the client is looking for. This attack can be easily
mitigated by enforcing the clients to generate the secret key without depending on
the data owner to act as the trusted dealer. The threshold GM cryptosystem without
the trusted dealer has been proposed by Katz and Yung [24]. In this case, all clients
execute distributed key generation algorithm that has been described before in Sec-
tion 2.2.3 and obtain their share of secret key as well as the public key. The public
key is then sent to the data owner for database encryption.
4.5.2 Complexity Analysis
This section explores the complexity of the proposed SP-KS and SP-SQL protocols in
terms of storage, communication and computation. Moreover, the eﬃciency of each
protocol is compared with the existing research proposals.
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Let N be the number of the existing records, n the number of the reported nodes
that satisfy the query predicates in the case of partial matching and range matching
queries and k is the threshold of the GM scheme. Furthermore, let d denotes the
total number of attributes and s indicates the number of attributes in the query
predicates. Notice that the computation complexity of the tree traversal for exact
matching, partial matching and interval matching is O(logN), O(n + N1−s/d) and
O(n + N1−1/d), respectively [62]. Furthermore, the communication complexity of
SPIR is O(K logN) where K is the security parameter whereas the computation cost
on the client and the server is O(logN) and O(N logN), respectively.
Storage Complexity
SP-KS Protocol. For each keyword, the server needs to generate Δ and c to enable
comparison. Therefore, total storage overhead of SP-KS protocol is O(N).
SP-SQL Protocols. The server needs to store a table contains the ciphertext
together with the generated Δ and c for each column whose corresponding attribute
appears in the query predicate. Therefore, the total storage overhead of SP-SQL
protocol is O(Ns) on the server.
Communication Complexity
SP-KS Protocol. In SP-KS protocol, the client-server communication is required to
retrieve the index of tree root associated with the bin –that contains the query result–
and traversing the tree. The length of array I is
√
N . Thus, the communication cost of
retrieving the root index by SPIR isK log
√
N = O(Kλ logN) whereK is the security
parameter of SPIR and λ is the error parameter of the Fischlin protocol. Traversing
the tree with
√
N nodes requires at most log
√
N = O(logN) steps. At each step,
the root is retrieved from the set of N nodes by SPIR. The communication cost of
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SPIR is K logN , Therefore, traversing the tree imposes communication complexity
of O(Kλ log2N).
In addition, the client needs to communicate with k active clients to decrypt
the ciphertext sequences c and Δ. This step requires totally exchanging O(ksλ logN)
bits. Finally, the client communicates with the data owner to decrypt the payload.
Since the query result contains at most one keyword-payload pair, we can ignore the
communication cost of the query result decryption. Therefore the total communica-
tion complexity of SP-KS protocol is O(K log2N)
SP-SQL Protocol. The communication cost of SP-SQL is proportional to the
number of visited nodes and depends on the type of the query. Each iteration requires
the execution of one instance of SPIR and the ciphertext decryption. The execution
of an instance of SPIR incurs O(K logN) on both sides for communication. The
communication cost of each ciphertext decryption is O(kd) per visited node.
Therefore, the communication cost of SP-SQL for diﬀerent type of queries is as
follow:
− Exact matching: the number of visited nodes is O(logN). Therefore, the com-
munication cost is O
(
logN(K logN + kd)
)
which is O(K log2N).
− Partial matching: the number of visited nodes is O(n+N1−s/d). Therefore, the
communication cost is O
(








− Range matching: the number of visited nodes is O(n+N1−1/d). Therefore, the
communication cost is O
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SP-KS Protocol. Computation complexity on the active participants, the client, the
server and the data owner can be computed as follow:
Active Participants. In every iteration, each active participant requires to com-
pute its own share of plaintext to decrypt Δ and c. Therefore, the total computation
overhead on each participant is O(logN).
Client. In the beginning of the SP-KS protocol, the client needs to encrypt
the search word in O(m) time, obtain the bin number in O(1) and retrieves the tree
root from array I by SPIR in O(K logN). Searching the tree is done by at most
log
√
N = O(logN) iteration and each iteration consists of retrieving root by SPIR,
performing private comparison and updating index. The root is retrieved from the bin
with size
√
N that incurs K log
√
N = O(K logN) computational complexity. The
computation cost of ciphertext decryption (from the received shares of plaintext)
is 2km. Updating the index is performed by simple arithmetic in constant time.
Therefore, the cost of tree traversal on client is O(K log2N).
Server. In each query session, the server needs to execute private comparison
query on all array elements to generate c and Δ. The computation complexity of this







N logN). Tree traversal requires log
√
N iteration
of SPIR on database T that imposes total computation cost of O(N log2N) to the
server. Therefore, the total computation complexity on the server is O(6Nlλ) +
O(N log2N) = O(N log2N).
Data Owner. In the preprocessing step, the data owner must construct the
left-balancing binary search tree and encrypt the records. Computation complexity
of tree construction and encryption is O(N logN) and O(N), respectively. Moreover,
the time complexity of the payload decryption is O(1).
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SP-SQL Protocol. According to a similar complexity analysis for the range
queries, the computation complexity on the active participants and the client is
O(dm(n + N1−1/d)) and O((n + N1−1/d) logN), respectively. The time complexity
of SP-SQL on the server is O((nN + N2−1/d) logN). For the data owner, the pre-
processing step imposes O(N logN) +O(Nd) for tree construction and the database
encryption.
For the exact matching queries, the computation complexity on the active par-
ticipants and the client is O(dm(n + d logN)) and O(K(n + d logN) logN), respec-
tively. The time complexity of SP-SQL on the server is O(K(nN + dN logN) logN).
For the data owner, the preprocessing step imposes O(N logN)+O(Nd) for tree con-
struction and the database encryption. In addition, the data owner must decrypt at
most one ciphertext (encrypted sum). Therefore, SP-SQL incurs O(1) computation
cost on the data owner in each query session.
A Comparison with Previous Works
In this section, we compare the complexity of SP-KS and SP-SQL protocols with the
existing works in the literature. To be consistent with the existing works, we consider
the two-party SP-KS and SP-SQL protocols where the database belongs to the server
and records are stored as cleartext. In this case, the payload is encrypted by Paillier
encryption using the server’s public key while the keywords are encrypted by GM
encryption using client’s public key. Therefore, the cost of database encryption and
threshold decryption is not considered. The modified two-party SP-KS protocol is
secure in the presence of colluding clients. The result of comparing SP-KS with exist-
ing works is represented in Table 10. Our result indicates that SP-KS has sublinear
communication overhead and it is eﬃcient in terms of computation complexity on the
client.
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The comparison of SP-SQL with the naive approach is presented in Table 11.
To the best of our knowledge, there is no approach for symmetrically-private SQL
search over relational databases that protects the privacy of both client’s query and
database records. Therefore, we compare SP-SQL protocol with the naive approach
explained in Section 4.3. As the comparison results show, SP-SQL achieves better
communication complexity and computation complexity on the client, however the
computation complexity on the server is more than the naive approach. This is rea-





















Table 10: Comparison of SP-KS Protocol with Existing Works
















































Naive approach All types of
queries
O(sN) O(sN) O(sN)
Table 11: Comparison of SP-SQL With The Naive Approach
4.6 Performance Analysis
We concentrate on SP-SQL in the conducted experiments because SP-KS can be
considered as a special case of SP-SQL. To evaluate the performance of SP-SQL, we
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implemented a prototype in Java 1.6 using the BigInteger class provided by the Java
standard API. The secret shares of the GM cryptosystem are 256-bit long. Moreover,
we employed the publicly available Bank Marketing dataset [107]. This dataset has
45,211 records with 17 attributes. The client’s and the server’s side experiments were
conducted on an Intel dual Core i5 2.3GHz Notebook with 4GB RAM.
In the first experiment, we derive the total execution time of the basic SP-SQL
for diﬀerent types of queries as shown in Figure 12. We also compare the execution
time of SP-SQL with the naive approach. The experimental result indicates that
SP-SQL reduces the computation overhead on the client by 61% for the range queries
execution and 44% for the execution of the partial matching queries, compared with
the naive approach. We also observe that as the number of attributes in the query


















Figure 12: The Eﬀect of The Query Predicate Types
For SQL queries, we vary the number of attributes in the query in the second ex-
periment. Figure 13 plots the client CPU and the cloud server CPU. The server CPU
decreases as the number of attributes increases. Similarly, the client CPU initially
decreases as the number of attributes increases, because the number of comparisons
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and the number of visited nodes decrease. However, as the number of attributes in-
creases, the cost of aggregating the shares of the plaintext increases. Therefore, the
client CPU gradually increases.












Server CPU Client CPU
Figure 13: Query Response Time
The third experiment measures the eﬀect of the database size on the query
execution time on the client. We use datasets containing 400 records, 4000 records,
and 40,000 records. Our experimental result, as shown in Figure 14, indicates that
the basic SP-SQL would work well with small to medium size datasets (with the total
number of 1,000-20,000 records) and the queries that contain multiple attributes in
the predicates. Notice that financial datasets contain high-dimensional data with
multiple columns. Therefore, we believe that the proposed protocols are appropriate
candidates for this type of applications.
In the final experiment, shown in Figure 15, we compare the total execution
time of the two approaches of SP-SQL for a 45,211-record dataset. The experiment
indicates that for queries with small number of attributes, the improved approach
outperforms the basic one significantly. This can be justified because the cost of
SPIR, that is proportional to the number of the visited nodes, is totally removed in


















Figure 14: The Eﬀect of The Database Size
increases, the number of the visited nodes decreases and the cost of SPIR would be
relatively small compared to the cost of the private comparison.














Figure 15: Basic vs. Improved SP-SQL Approaches
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4.7 Discussion and Conclusions
In this chapter, we have provided two protocols for symmetrically-private database
search that leverage symmetric private information retrieval and private integer com-
parison to protect the query privacy of the clients and the data privacy of the database
owner. In this section, we will answer some frequently raised questions.
PIR vs. SPIR. In this chapter, we utilize SPIR protocol to retrieve the data of
the root in order to protect the index of the root as well as the data of other records.
Note that the database that is queried by the client using SPIR, only contains the
ciphertext sequences Δ and c. These ciphertext sequences do not leak any information
about the input of the database (i.e., the database record) to the client. Therefore,
instead of SPIR we can use PIR which is more cache friendly; using PIR, the client
can recover additional items that may be utilized later without the need of PIR for
retrieval.
Semi-Honest Adversary Model. In this thesis, we assume that the ad-
versaries are semi-honest. This is the common security definition used in the SMC
literature [108]. It is realistic to assume that the client and the server are semi-honest
in our problem scenario since the client and the server are collaborating to execute
queries for mutual benefits: the company, providing cloud services, seeks to extend
its business by building reputation and trust for its own services. On the other hand,
the client is searching the database to extract useful information for her own benefit.
Individual Privacy. SP-SQL and SP-KS protocols do not preserve individ-
ual privacy. Therefore, an individual whose record exists in the database, may be
identified from the query result. Note that the information that can be derived from
the query result are considered to be secure. Therefore, secure multiparty compu-
tation techniques cannot solve this problem. To overcome this deficiency, the data
owner can employ Privacy-Preserving Data Publishing (PPDP) [109] techniques that
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anonymize the raw data. The anonymized data prevent the adversary to re-identify
an individual from the released database and/or the released query result.
Communication-Computation Trade-off. The eﬃciency of the proposed
protocols highly depend on the utilized SPIR protocol. Some SPIR protocols are
costly in terms of computation but eﬃcient in terms of communication [110]. Others
are costly in terms of communication but eﬃcient in terms of computation [111].
Therefore, the choice of the underlying SPIR protocol depends on the environment.
For example, consider the following two scenarios:
− Scenario 1. Consider a company that provides DBaaS in the cloud envi-
ronment. This company hosts databases of diﬀerent data owners on a single
cloud server. Consequently, the cloud server may receive thousands of database
queries requesting for information. In this case, if the underlying SPIR is costly
in terms of computation on the server side, the cloud server will become the
single point of bottleneck.
− Scenario 2. Consider a hospital that outsources the medical databases to a
private cloud server and provides the clients with cellphone applications for
querying. In this case, the computation complexity on the client and the com-
munication overhead are the major concerns because mobile devices are limited
in hardware resources and bandwidth.
As the above mentioned scenarios illustrate, an SPIR protocol should be chosen




Processing in Cloud Computing
5.1 Introduction
There have been many fatal and highly contagious diseases throughout history. The
Black Death was one of the most devastating pandemics in human history, peaking in
Europe in the 14th century and killing between 75 million and 200 million people [112].
Centers for Disease Control and prevention (CDC) [113] estimate that between about
8,870 and 18,300 H1N1-related deaths occurred between April 2009 and April 10,
2010. Early detection of such diseases could save millions of lives. With the vast
number of people traveling around the world, an outbreak in a busy city such as New
York or London could end up spreading around the world within few days. There are
many organizations which work on studying epidemiology and preventing them from
spreading around the world; World Health Organization (WHO) [114] is one of them.
To better understand what caused a disease, health organizations and re-
searchers need as much data as possible about the infected patients. Therefore health
organizations and researchers need to have access to the latest updated information
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about the patients in order to conduct epidemiological studies. Typically, a patient
has many diﬀerent healthcare providers including primary care physicians, special-
ists, therapists, hospitals and pharmacies. As a result, a patient’s Electronic Health
Records (EHRs) [115] is usually scattered throughout the entire healthcare sectors.
From the clinical perspective, in order to deliver quality patient care, it is critical
to access the integrated information. Therefore, sharing Electronic Health Records
(EHRs) is one of the key requirements in healthcare domain for delivering high qual-
ity healthcare services [116]. However, the sharing process could be very complex and
involved with various entities with diﬀerent duties and objectives. A shared EHR may
consist of sensitive information of the patients such as demographic details, allergy
information, medical histories, and laboratory test results. Access control solutions
must be in place to guarantee that access to sensitive information is limited only
to those entities that have a legitimate privilege, allowed by the patients. For ex-
ample, a patient may not be willing to share his medical information regarding an
HIV/AIDS diagnosis with a dentist unless a specific treatment is required. Therefore,
it is important to address security challenges such as data confidentiality and access
control [117].
It has become a recent trend for the patients to take these matters into their
own hands by managing their records using a Personal Health Record (PHR) system.
PHR is a patient-centric model of managing health information that allows a patient
to create, manage, and control her personal health data in a centralized place through
the web. The patients have the full control of their medical records and can share
their health and fitness data with a wide range of users of their choice, including
healthcare providers, their family members and insurance companies. In the past few
years, many providers have created platforms to manage PHRs with features including
flexible access control, mobile access, and complex automated diagnoses that analyze
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the patients records and alert them when a preventive checkup is needed. These
providers include Microsoft HealthVault [118] and Dossia [119].
Recently, architectures of storing PHRs in cloud have been proposed [120]. The
main concern about these services is the privacy and the security of patients’ personal
health data. Since the health records are stored on a third-party provider, the patients
will eventually lose the control of their data and the data will be under the control
of the servers. Therefore, the PHR data could be leaked if an insider in the cloud
provider’s organization misbehaves. As a famous incident, a Department of Veter-
ans Aﬀairs database containing personal health information of 26.5 million military
veterans, including their social security numbers and health conditions was stolen by
an employee who took the data home without authorization [121]. For these reasons,
researchers have begun searching for a way to allow patients to store their medical
records on the cloud using a Database-as-a-Service (DBaaS) model while preserving
their privacy. Li et al. [122] have suggested Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE) as a
solution to secure the stored medical records. ABE is utilized to encrypt and store
the PHR data on semi-trusted servers, so that patients as well as various users from
public domains with diﬀerent professional roles, can have controlled access to PHRs.
To produce statistical information about health records, patients can give access
to health organizations. According to a report from the consulting firm PwC [123],
health organizations are falling short in protecting the privacy and security of patient
information [124]. Additionally, according to the same report [123], more than half
of health organizations said they had at least one issue with information security
and privacy since 2009 and the most frequently observed issue is the improper use of
protected health information by someone who worked in the organization.
In this chapter, we propose a solution that allows the health organization to pro-
duce statistical information about encrypted PHRs stored in the cloud. In addition,
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the proposed solution should not enable the patients to infer about what the health
organizations are concerned about in order to not create panic about epidemics in
the community.
5.2 Threat Model
In this section, we first identify the involved entities and the privacy objectives. Then
the threat model and the assumptions underlying the system design will be presented.
5.2.1 Entities Involved in The Protocol
There are three main entities in the system as illustrated in Fig. 16:
− Patients who own medical records and want to store them on the cloud server
and protect their confidentiality. Note that the security of these records depends
on the security of handling the plaintext data before it arrives to the cloud
server and the the security of data-at-rest while storing them on the cloud. For
this reason, when patient data is initially uploaded from patients or doctors, it
will arrive at the cloud server via a secure channel (e.g. SSL). However, this
encryption only protects the data while it is in transit. After the data arrives
on the cloud server, it is delivered as plaintext to the cloud server. A common
way to protect the medical record of the patients from being leaked to the cloud
server is through encryption. For this reason, the necessary keys for encryption
will be resident in the encryption device on the cloud when the data is encrypted.
These devices are designed in such a way that, after a patient places a key into
the key memory of the device, it cannot be read externally [125]. To generate
the keys, the patients will be organized in smaller groups and jointly generate
one key for the threshold Paillier cryptosystem and one key for the threshold
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GM cryptosystem together with the share of the secret keys. The public keys
and the share of the secret keys will be stored on the encryption devices. The
devices encrypt the received plaintext using these keys and send the resulted
ciphertexts to the assisting server (see below).
− Cloud server that stores the encrypted health records of the patients and ex-
ecutes the queries of the health organization over the encrypted records. The
cloud server should enable the patients to access and update their records if
required. The cloud server will assign an assisting server to each group. The as-
sisting server will be responsible for storing the encrypted record of the patients
and executing the SQL queries of the health organization.
− Health organization that wants to execute queries over the encrypted database
of the patients and produce statistical information.
The patients are assumed to behave properly, but they may try to derive infor-
mation from the queries issued by the health organization. Similar to [10], we assume
that the shape or textual content of SQL queries is not private, but the constants
provided by the health organization in the WHERE clause are private, and must be
protected. Our approach to preserve query privacy over a relational database is based
on hiding all these constants. The cloud server is trusted in the sense that it will ex-
ecute the received requests correctly and it does not temper the patients’ medical
records (inadvertently or deliberately); however we do not rely on it to maintain the
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Figure 16: Architecture
5.2.2 Assumptions and Threat Model
The threat model that we consider is one where an adversarial entity controls some
subset of the parties and wishes to attack the protocol execution. The parties under
the control of the adversary are called corrupted, and follow the adversary’s instruc-
tions. We assume that there is no trusted entity in the environment and all parties
act as semi-honest adversaries.
We assume that the number of corrupted patients is less than a specific thresh-
old, denoted by k. In our scheme, if the assisting server and at least k patients, who
have the shares of the secret key, collude they can recover the secret key and decrypt
the constants in the query predicate. We also assume that there are mechanisms
which ensure integrity and availability of the remotely stored data. Our scheme fo-
cuses only on confidentiality issues and does not provide protection against attacks
such as data tampering and denial of service. Our scheme is a building block that
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can be integrated into larger more comprehensive frameworks for securing database
on untrusted cloud servers.
5.3 Secure Distributed Techniques
In this section, we present distributed techniques that can be used to support secure
distributed computation. Assume that there exists n parties and the input of the
i-th party is the value vi. 1 ≤ i ≤ n. The protocols presented in this section aim to
calculate the sum, the maximum and the minimum of vi’s as input. At the end of the
protocol execution, the parties do not learn anything except the result. The proposed
protocols assume that the parties are not malicious and they correctly carry out the
prescribed functions.
5.3.1 Secure Distributed Sum
Distributed algorithms frequently require the sum of inputs from individual parties.
Our approach to securely find the sum of the parties’ input is based on the traditional
ring-based approach [126] where the parties form a ring and messages are forwarded
in a pre-defined direction. A master party P1 is elected and starts the computation
by sending v = v1 + r (for a random r) to its neighbor, which adds its own input
to v and forwards the result along. Once arrived back at the master, the final sum
is obtained as s = −r + v and is broadcast to other parties. Traditional ring-based
approach is susceptible to the attack from the colluding parties [127], since if the
party i− 1 and the party i + 1 collude, they can recover the input of the i-th party.
Numerous improvements have been proposed to defeat against the collusion attack
such as permuting the path after each execution [127], sharing vi’s between the parties
(the same source [127]) and distributing the shares of the random number r between
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the parties [128].
Our approach utilizes randomization as well as threshold encryption to prevent
collusion attack. In this case, our proposed approach is secure against the colluding
parties as long as the master (see below) does not collude. Assuming n parties (n ≥ 3)
and a non-colluding master, the following method securely computes sum.
One party is chosen as master, named P1. The remaining parties are numbered
P2, . . . , Pn. The master is responsible for initiating the secure distributed sum proto-
col. The parties execute distributed key generation algorithm [48] to obtain the public
key and the shares of secret key for the threshold Paillier cryptosystem. The master
then generates a random number R, adds its input to this number and encrypts the
resulted sum by the group public key using Paillier encryption. Then, the master
forwards the ciphertext to P2. The i-th party Pi (2 ≤ i ≤ n) receives E(R+Σi−1j=1vj).
Since this ciphertext is encrypted with the group public key, it cannot decrypt it indi-
vidually and learn anything. Party Pi then encrypts its input vi by the group public
key and multiplies E(vi) by the encrypted sum to obtain E(R + Σ
i
j=1vj). Then, it
passes the encrypted sum to the i + 1-th party. The n-th party performs the above
step and passes the result to the master. The master must decrypt the result to
obtain the actual sum. To decrypt the query result that is encrypted with the group
public key, the master contacts the parties and sends them the ciphertext for the
decryption. These parties partially decrypt the encrypted sum using their share of
secret key and sends their share of plaintext to the master. The master then recovers
the noisy sum by combining the shares of plaintext and extract the noise R to find
the actual sum. Then it broadcasts the actual query result to the other parties. The
steps of Secure Distributed Sum is presented in Algorithm 1.
The proposed approach is secure while the master is not colluding with the
other colluding parties. In this case, even if all the parties that are asked to perform
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decryption, are corrupted and collude with each other they can only find out the
noisy sum. But, if the contacted parties and parties i− 1 and i+ 1 collude, they can
find out the input of the i-th party.
Algorithm 1 Secure Distributed Sum
Require: n parties P1, P2, . . . , Pn, each party Pi has a local input vi. Output:
Σni=1vi.
1: P1 is acting as a master.
2: P1, . . . , Pn executes distributed key generation algorithm. Each party Pi obtains
the group public key pk and the secret key ski.
3: P1 generates random number R, add it to v1 and encrypts v1 + R by Paillier
cryptosystem using pk to obtain c1 = EPL(v1 +R, pk).
4: P1 forwards c1.
5: for Each party i (2 ≤ i ≤ n) do
6: Pi receives the message ci−1 from Pi−1;
7: Pi encrypts vi by pk;
8: Pi computes ci = ci−1.EPL(vi, pk);
9: Pi forwards ci to P(i+1) mod n.
10: end for
11: P1 receives the message cn = E(R + Σ
n
i=1vi, pk) from Pn.
12: P1 sends cn to k
′ parties for decryption.
13: P1 aggregates the ciphertexts from the k
′ parties and obtains R + Σni=1vi.
14: P1 calculates −R +R + Σni=1vi = Σni=1vi to obtain actual sum.
15: P1 broadcast the actual sum to the parties P2, . . . , Pn.
5.3.2 Secure Distributed Maximum/Minimum
Consider several parties having their own input. The problem is to securely com-
pute the maximum and the minimum of these local inputs. Formally, given n
parties P1, . . . , Pn, having local inputs v1, . . . , vn. We wish to securely compute
max{v1, v2, . . . , vn} and min{v1, v2, . . . , vn}. To calculate the maximum and the mini-
mum, the private comparison protocol and the threshold GM cryptosystem are used.
We explain the technique for calculating the maximum; distributed minimum function
can be securely computed in a similar way.
Parties jointly generate a group public key PK for the k-out-of-n threshold GM
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cryptosystem such that all parties obtain the shares of the secret key [24]. One party
is chosen as the master, numbered 1. The master encrypts her local input, bit by bit,
using the group public key and forwards it to the party P2 as the current maximum.
Each party Pi, upon receiving the message from Pi−1, encrypts her local input vi
by the group public key and executes Fischlin protocol, given the current encrypted
maximum in the message and her encrypted local value as the inputs. The output of
Fischlin protocol is an encrypted ciphertext sequence Δ that indicates if the current
maximum is greater than the vi or not. To decrypt the sequence Δ, Pi contacts with
k parties and sends the generated Δ for decryption. Each party calculates the share
of the plaintext and sends it back to Pi. Afterwards, Pi constructs the plaintext from
the received shares: if the decrypted Δ contains a sequence of λ 1s, it means that
the current maximum is greater than vi; therefore Pi does not modify the received
message and forwards it to Pi+1, as it is. Otherwise, vi is the current maximum and
Pi must encrypt it, bit by bit, using the group public key and forwards it to Pi+1. At
the end of query result forwarding, the master obtains the encrypted maximum and
decrypts it bit by bit, by communicating with k randomly-chosen parties. Finally,
the master broadcasts the maximum to the other parties. The algorithm for secure
maximum is represented in Algorithm 2. Distributed maximum/minimum protocol
is secure if the number of semi-honest parties controlled by the adversary is at most
equal to k − 1.
The proposed distributed protocols require that all parties to be online for
executing the protocol. However, each party can decide if she is willing to participate
in the query execution or not.
Remark 1. The proposed secure maximum/minimum protocol illustrates how a
party can perform comparison on two ciphertexts without knowing the secret key.
This idea can be extended to enable a party to sort a sequence of ciphertexts without
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Algorithm 2 Secure Distributed Maximum
Require: n parties P1, P2, . . . , Pn, each party Pi has a local input vi with the bit
length l. Output: max{vi}.
1: P1, P2, . . . , Pn executes the distributed key generation to produce the group
public key PK and shares of secret key SK1, SK2, . . . , SKn.
2: SKi will be assigned to Pi.
3: P1 is acting as a master.
4: P1 encrypts v1 = (v1,l, . . . , v1,1)2 by GM encryption using PK to obtain c1 =
{EGM(v1,l), . . . , EGM(v1,1)}.
5: P1 forwards c1 to P2.
6: for Each party Pi (2 ≤ i ≤ n) do
7: receives the message ci−1 from Pi−1;
8: encrypts vi, bit by bit by PK to obtain the set {EGM(vi,l), . . . , EGM(vi,1)};
9: executes Fischlin protocol where inputs are ci−1 and {EGM(vi,l), . . . , EGM(vi,1)}
to obtain an encrypted ciphertext sequence Δ;
10: Pi forwards Δ to k randomly-selected parties P
′
1, . . . , P
′
k.
11: for Each party j (1 ≤ j ≤ k) do
12: decrypts Δ with her share of secret key SKj.
13: sends decrypted ciphertext sequence to Pi.
14: end for
15: receives decrypted Δ from P ′1, . . . , P
′
k
16: extracts the actual ciphertext sequence from the received plaintexts.
17: if there is a sequence of λ 1s in the random position of the decrypted ciphertext
sequence then
18: // the current maximum is greater than vi
19: ci = ci−1
20: else
21: // the current maximum is not greater than vi
22: ci = EGM(vi)
23: end if
24: sends ci to party P(i+1) mod n
25: end for
26: P1 receives the message cn from Pn.
27: P1 communicates with k randomly-selected parties and send them cn.
28: The parties P ′1, . . . , P
′
k decrypts cn to obtain m1, . . . ,mk.
29: P ′j sends mj to P1 where 1 ≤ j ≤ k′.
30: P1 combines m1, . . . ,mk to obtain max{vi} where 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
31: P1 broadcasts max{vi} (1 ≤ i ≤ n) to P2, . . . , Pn.
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knowing the secret key. In this case, any comparison-based sorting algorithm can be
utilized and the comparison is performed on the encrypted values, using any private
integer comparison protocols.
5.4 Secure Healthcare Query Processing in Cloud
Computing
In this section, we present a protocol that allows the patients to store their medical
record on the cloud server. Patients’ information is stored in a database and mined
for statistical information by the health organization. The proposed solution should
protect the data privacy of the patients in such a way that the cloud server and
the health organization do not learn anything about the sensitive information of the
patients. Moreover, the patients and the cloud server should not be able to infer
anything about the constants in the queries of the health organization.
The inputs to the protocol is as follow: the health organization provides an
aggregate SQL query that consists of exact-matching and interval-matching predicates
combined with logical operators (AND/OR/NOT). The cloud server’s input is the
encrypted health records of the patients. The cloud server is responsible for executing
the SQL queries such that the privacy goals of the patients and the health organization
are reached.
The naive approach to achieve the mentioned privacy objectives is that the
health organization communicates with each patient and securely evaluates its queries
on the patients’ record. This can be achieved by exploiting the Fischlin’s protocol
for private comparison. However, this approach incurs excessive communication and
computation overhead on the health organization side which is linear in the number
of patients. To reduce the overhead, the patients are organized into smaller groups.
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The patients in each group jointly generate two public keys for Goldwasser-Micali [42]
and Paillier [26] encryption schemes. Then they encrypt their records and outsource
them to the cloud server for storage. The cloud server assigns an assisting server to
each group which is responsible for receiving SQL query of the health organization
and securely executing it on the records of the patients to obtain the partial results.
The assisting servers then collaborate to obtain the final query result from the partial
results and report it to the health organization.
In the following, we elaborate the basic steps of our protocol that protects the
data privacy of the patients and the query privacy of the health organization.
5.4.1 Setup and Tree Construction
The cloud server defines L = √N groups where N is the total number of patients.
It then randomly maps each patient into exactly one group. Let n = N
L
 denotes
the number of patients in each group. The cloud server assigns an assisting server to
each group which is responsible for executing the health organization’s queries over
the medical database of the patients. The assisting servers also collaborate with each
other to obtain the query result from the partial results and send it to the health
organization.
Note that if each patient encrypts her record with her own unique public key,
the health organization needs to generate one query per patient. In this case, the
computation and communication overhead on the health organization will be similar
to the naive approach. To encrypt the patients’ records with a single key and also
protect the records from the other patients in the same group, we utilize the threshold
GM [24] and threshold Paillier [48] cryptosystem without the trusted dealer.
In the i-th group, the patients execute the distributed key generation algorithm
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for the threshold Paillier and the threshold GM cryptosystems to obtain jointly-
generated public keys pk′i and pki for Paillier and GM cryptosystems, respectively
together with their share of secret keys. Each patient then stores the group public
keys and her private keys on a Field-Programmable Logic Array (FPGA) as de-
tailed in [125]. The FPGAs are programmed to form an independent semi-trusted
third party platform within the cloud infrastructure. Since these devices run as au-
tonomous compute elements, the cloud administrator does not have low-level access
to computations running within them. These FPGAs are designed in such a way that,
after a patient places a key into the key memory on the device, the key cannot be read
externally. The FPGAs is then delivered to the cloud operator for installation. Note
that decrypting a ciphertext by the cloud server is performed by sending a ciphertext
to the FPGA of the patients. Since the FPGAs have the share of secret key, they can
decrypt the ciphertext partially and sends it back to the sender.
The threshold cryptosystems enables the patients to encrypt their record with a
single public key while at least a minimal number of patients are required to decrypt a
ciphertext. All the patients in each group uploads their medical records through their
FPGA on the cloud server. Note that the medical records are multidimensional data
and the FPGA encrypts them using Paillier and GM cryptosystems by the associated
group public key. Therefore, the encrypted record of each patient, produced by the
FPGA, has two columns for each attribute in the database: one column that contains
the encryption of the attribute value using the group public key for threshold Paillier
cryptosystem, and another column that stores the GM encryption of the attribute
value using the group public key for threshold GM cryptosystem.
Example 8. Consider the health records with the attributes Age and Surgery, where
the value of the attribute Surgery specifies the type of the surgery that the patient
undergoes (e.g. 1: Transgender, 2: Plastic, 3:Vascular, 4: Urology). Assume that
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the patients, whose records are represented in Table 12, are willing to outsource their
health records to the cloud server. The total number of patients is N = 10; therefore,
these patients must be organized in L =
√
10 ≈ 3 groups, namely, G1, G2 and G3.
Assume that the patients 1,9 and 10 are assigned to G1; patients 2, 4, 5 and 8 are
assigned to G2 and patients 3, 6 and 7 are assigned to G3. The assignments are
performed randomly. The patients in the group Gi jointly generate the public key pki
for the threshold GM cryptosystem. Moreover, the patients in the group Gi jointly
generate the public key pk′i for for the threshold Paillier cryptosystem and publish
pk′i to the health organization. The members of the group Gi encrypt each attribute
value of their records with the threshold GM cryptosystem using pki and the threshold
Paillier cryptosystem using pk′i as shown in Fig. 17. After that, the patients outsource
their encrypted records to the cloud server.
Age Surgery
Patient 1 34 1
Patient 2 39 2
Patient 3 20 1
Patient 4 59 3
Patient 5 63 4
Patient 6 27 2
Patient 7 78 4
Patient 8 11 2
Patient 9 83 3
Patient 10 42 3
Table 12: Health Records
The assisting server collects the encrypted records and organizes them as a kD-
tree using the algorithm explained in Section 2.3. Constructing the tree requires
sorting the records at each level and dividing the database into two subsets by calcu-
lating the number of nodes in the left subtree (LT ) and the right subtree (RT ). Since
the records are encrypted, the sorting algorithm must be executed on the ciphertexts.
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AgeGM SurgeryGM AgeP SurgeryP
Patient 1 Epk1(34) Epk1(1) Epk′1(34) Epk′1(1)
Patient 9 Epk1(83) Epk1(3) Epk′1(83) Epk′1(3)
Patient 10 Epk1(42) Epk1(3) Epk′1(42) Epk′1(3)
(a) G1 Database
AgeGM SurgeryGM AgeP SurgeryP
Patient 2 Epk2(39) Epk2(2) Epk′2(39) Epk′2(2)
Patient 4 Epk2(59) Epk2(3) Epk′2(59) Epk′2(3)
Patient 5 Epk2(63) Epk2(4) Epk′2(63) Epk′2(4)
Patient 8 Epk2(11) Epk2(2) Epk′2(11) Epk′2(2)
(b) G2 Database
AgeGM SurgeryGM AgeP SurgeryP
Patient 3 Epk3(20) Epk3(1) Epk′3(20) Epk′3(1)
Patient 6 Epk3(27) Epk3(2) Epk′3(27) Epk′3(2)
Patient 7 Epk3(78) Epk3(4) Epk′3(78) Epk′3(4)
(c) G3 Database
Figure 17: Outsourced Health Records in Groups
The sorting algorithm on the ciphertexts has been described before in Remark 1 (Sec-
tion 5.3) as an extension of secure maximum/minimum. Therefore, constructing the
left-balancing kD-tree from the ciphertexts can be performed by the assisting server
even though it does not have the decryption key. The kD-tree has the advantage of
reducing the number of comparisons, required for the query execution.
Example 9. (Continued from Example 8) The generated kD-trees for each group are
shown in Fig. 18. The partitioning attributes in each group may be diﬀerent. At the
first level, Age is used to partition the records of G1 and G2 whereas Surgery is used
to partition the records of G3.
5.4.2 Query Sanitization
The health organization needs to execute a query such that the constants in the
query predicate are not revealed to the patients and the cloud server. Accordingly,
the health organization sanitizes its SQL query by replacing the constants contained
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Epk1  42 Epk1  3
Epk1  34 Epk1  1 Epk1  83 Epk1  3
Age







(b) G2 kD tree
Epk3  27 Epk3  2
Epk3  20 Epk3  1 Epk3  78 Epk3  4
Surgery
(c) G3 kD tree
Figure 18: Generated kD-Trees
in the predicates by their GM encryption using the public key of each group. For
instance, if the query of the health organization is
SELECT MAX(Age) FROM D WHERE Surgery = 1
The sanitized query that is forwarded to the i-th group (1 ≤ i ≤ n) will be
SELECT MAX(Age) FROM D WHERE Surgery = Epki(1)
In addition to the sanitized query, the health organization generates a token for
each group that is encrypted by the group public key using the Paillier cryptosystem.
The encrypted token is a random number which is manipulated by the assisting
servers to produce the noisy query result. Generating the token depends on the
type of the aggregate function in the query; for count and sum functions, the health
organization generates a random number R and produces L additive shares of R,
namely R1, R2, . . . , RL such that R = R1 + R2 + . . . + RL. The random share Ri
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will be the token that is sent to the assisting server of the group i. For the max and
min functions, the health organization populates the same random numbers R, as the
token, for all groups. The health organization then encrypts the token of each group
using Paillier cryptosystem by the group public key.
The health organization forwards the sanitized query together with the en-
crypted token to assisting servers. Therefore, in this step the health organization
should create L sanitized queries and L encrypted tokens.
5.4.3 Tree Traversal and Query Execution
The health organization forwards the sanitized SQL query and the encrypted token
to the assisting servers for execution. To execute the query of the health organization,
the assisting server must traverse the kD-tree, constructed from the encrypted records
of the patients. To do so, the assisting servers follow the tree traversal algorithm
explained in Chapter 4 without the need of the symmetrically-private information
retrieval (SPIR) for retrieving root’s record. The search starts from the root; the as-
sisting server uses Fischlin protocol and the threshold GM decryption to evaluate the
query predicate. Based on the result of the query evaluation, the search is continued
on the left tree or the right subtree or both. Therefore, at the end of this step, the
assisting servers will end up with the records that satisfy the query predicate. The
assisting servers then compute the encrypted query result depending on the type of
the aggregate function as follows:
− count: The assisting server of the group Gi counts the number of records that
are reported as the query result and encrypts this value using the Paillier cryp-
tosystem with the group public key.
− sum: In the beginning, the assisting servers encrypt 0 (as the current sum) by
the Paillier encryption using the group public key. In the tree traversal step, if at
92
each level the conditions in the query predicate are satisfied, the assisting server
projects the record over the Paillier-encrypted column targeted by the aggregate
function and multiplies it by the the current sum to update the query result.
At the end, the assisting server will end up with the sum that is encrypted with
the group public key using the threshold Paillier cryptosystem.
− max (resp. min): Initially, the assisting servers pick up a small negative (resp.
large positive) number that denotes the current maximum (minimum) and en-
crypts it by the GM and the Paillier cryptosystems using the group public key.
GM-encrypted ciphertext is utilized for the comparison while Paillier-encrypted
ciphertext is used for generating noisy query result. During the tree traversal if
a record satisfies the query condition(s), the assisting server projects the record
over the columns that contain the GM- and the Paillier-encryption of the record.
It then executes Fischlin protocol using the encrypted current maximum (resp.
minimum) and the GM-encryption of the record, to find out if this record has
greater (resp. smaller) value or not. If so, the assisting server initializes the cur-
rent maximum (resp. minimum) to the GM- and the Paillier-encrypted cipher-
texts. Otherwise, the current maximum (resp. minimum) remains unchanged.
At the end, the assisting servers end up with the query result encrypted with
the Paillier and GM encryption. For the remaining step of the protocol, the
assisting servers only need the Paillier-encrypted ciphertext.
At the end of this step, the assisting servers obtain the partial query result (that
has been encrypted using Paillier scheme by the public key of the group), derived from
the database of the group.
Example 10. (Continued from Example 8) Consider the kD-trees presented in Fig.
18 and the sanitized query
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SELECT MAX(Age) FROM D WHERE Surgery = Epki(1) where 1 ≤ i ≤ L
All assisting servers receive an encrypted token Epk′
i
(R) from the health organization.
The assisting server of the group Gi extracts Epki(1) from the query and performs the
point search on the kD-tree constructed by the patients in the group Gi. The assisting
servers report the records that satisfy the predicate Surgery = Epki(1) by executing the
Fischlin protocol and the threshold GM cryptosystem to decrypt the output ciphertext
sequence. The record of the Patient 1 in G1 and the record of the Patient 3 in G3
satisfy the predicate. Therefore, the output of the tree traversal for assisting server
of groups G1, G2 and G3 will be {Epk1(34), Epk′1(34)}, {Epk2(−1000), Epk′2(−1000)}
and {Epk3(20), Epk′3(20)}, respectively. The resulted outputs will be projected over the
column AgeP to obtain {Epk′1(34)}, {Epk′2(−1000)} and {Epk′3(20)} as the encrypted
query result.
5.4.4 Query Result Decryption
So far, the assisting servers were able to obtain the encrypted partial query result.
Therefore, the assisting servers must collaborate with each other to compute the final
query result and submit it to the health organization.
The partial query results of the groups are encrypted with diﬀerent keys. There-
fore, in order to compute the final query result, the partial query result must be in the
cleartext. Since, the assisting servers are not willing to reveal the query result to each
other, the assisting servers first obfuscate the partial query result. The obfuscation
is performed by the mean of multiplying the encrypted query result by the encrypted
token, sent by the health organization (both of them are ciphertexts generated by
the same key under the Paillier cryptosystem). The obfuscation allows the assisting
servers to collaborate with each other to calculate the noisy query result while hiding
the actual query result of their group. In addition, since the noise is generated by
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the health organization, it allows the health organization to recover the actual query
result from the noisy query result. To produce the noisy query result, all assisting
servers multiply their encrypted token (received from the health organization) by the
Paillier-encrypted query result to generate encrypted noisy query result.
Afterwards, all assisting servers decrypt the resulted noisy query result – that
is encrypted by the Paillier cryptosystem – by contacting patients in their group.
The assisting servers then need to obtain the final noisy query result by aggregating
their partial noisy result. To do so, the assisting servers send the noisy query result in
plaintext to the cloud server. The cloud server then aggregates the partial noisy query
result to obtain the noisy query result; in the case of count and sum, the cloud server
adds up all the partial results and submits it to the health organization. In the case
of max and min aggregate functions, the cloud server executes maximum/minimum
algorithm on the plaintext and sends the resulted value to the health organization.
Note that the noise generated for obfuscating the maximum/minimum of all groups
is the same, therefore it will not aﬀect the algorithm correctness (i.e., if a < b then
a + R < b + R). Finally, the health organization in its turn subtracts the noise and
obtains the query result.
Example 11. (Continued from Example 10) We have seen that the result of executing
the SQL query
SELECT MAX(Age) FROM D WHERE Surgery = 1







respectively. Moreover, the token sent by the health organization to the i-th group is
Epk′
i
(R). The assisting servers multiply the received token ERpk′
i
by all records in the





(−1000 + R)} and {Epk′
3
(20 + R)}. The assisting servers then decrypt these
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ciphertexts to obtain 34+R, −1000+R and 20+R. They send their noisy plaintexts
to the cloud server. The cloud server executes the maximum algorithm on the 34+R,
−1000+R and 20+R and eventually ends up with 34+R as the maximum. The cloud
server forwards 34 + R to the health organization. The health organization subtracts
the noise R to obtain 34 as the result of executing the SQL query on the medical
database.
5.5 Security and Complexity Analysis
In this section, we discuss the security analysis of the proposed protocol for executing
healthcare queries. We will also provide the complexity analysis and a discussion on
the limitation of this work.
5.5.1 Possible Attacks and Mitigations
The proposed protocol is secure while the parties, namely the health organization,
the cloud server and the patients, do not collude. The main concern with threshold
cryptosystems comes from the collusion attack. Any collusion that contains less than
k patients in each group cannot learn any information about the ciphertext sequences
Δ and c generated for comparison as well as constants in the query of the health
organization. The most serious collusion attacks are when (i) the cloud server colludes
with more than k patients in each group to recover the encrypted database records,
(ii) the cloud server and at least k patients in a group collude to infer constants in
the query submitted by the health organization.
However in practice, we can lower the risk to an acceptable level by increasing
the threshold k such that the attackers are not able to compromise too many patients.
Despite simplicity, this mechanism has two disadvantages: First, it will decrease the
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system’s availability: as the number of required online data owners increases, it is
more unlikely that they are online to perform decryption. Second, it will increase the
communication cost on the party who is searching the database because she needs to
communicate with more parties for decryption. Therefore, there should be a trade-oﬀ
between availability-security and eﬃciency by choosing a proper value for k.
5.5.2 Complexity Analysis
Let N denotes the number of patients in the PHR system. These patients are orga-
nized in L ≈ √N groups and each group contains n = N/L patients. We assume that
k denotes the threshold of GM decryption where 1 ≤ k ≤ n. Moreover, we assume
that the number of bits required to store a value in the attribute domain, is l. For the
range query and the point query, the total number of comparisons on a kD-tree with
√
N records, will be O(N0.5−1/2d) and O(logN), respectively where d is the number of
attributes in the table [62]. Recall that for the Fischlin protocol, the communication
overhead is O(λ.l) and the computation cost on the client and the server is O(λ) and
O(λl), respectively.
For the sake of brevity, we only consider the cost of the steps that have major
eﬀect on the performance of the protocol.
Storage Overhead. For each column in the medical database with d columns,
the cloud server must stores two columns: one column that contains the Paillier
encryption and one that stores the GM encryption of the attribute value of the record.
Thus, the table on the cloud server has 2d columns.
Communication Overhead. The communication complexity of the protocol
on the health organization and the assisting servers is as follow:
Health organization. The health organization needs to communicate with the
assisting servers to send the sanitized query and receive the final result from the cloud
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server. Therefore, the total communication cost is O(L) = O(
√
N).
Assisting servers. The assisting servers should traverse the tree to execute the
SQL query. The communication complexity of the protocol depends on the number
of comparisons and consequently on the type of predicates in the query:
− Range queries. For each comparison performed in tree traversal, the assist-
ing server must communicate with the patients’ HSMs to decrypt ciphertext
sequences Δ and c, each has λ.l ciphertexts. Therefore, the communication
overhead for a range query will be O(kλl N0.5−1/2d) on each assisting server.
Since
√
N assisting servers reside on the cloud server, the total communication
cost of protocol execution will be O(kλl N1−1/2d).
− Point queries. According to a similar discussion, the communication over-
head of executing an exact-matching query will be O(klλ logN) on each as-




Computation Overhead. We calculate the computation overhead on the involved
parties as follow:
Health organization. The health organization needs to sanitizes the query by
encrypting the constants with the public key of each group. Therefore, the total
number of sanitized queries will be L =
√
N , leading to O(
√
N) time complexity on
the health organization.
Assisting server. The computation overhead on the assisting servers side is due
to traversing the tree. The computation overhead therefore depends on the type of
predicates as well as the type of aggregate function as explained in the follow.
− Range queries. The computational cost of range query over kD-tree is
O(N1−1/d + m) where m is the number of records in the range. For each
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comparison, the assisting server must execute Fischlin protocol (tFis), ag-
gregate the share of plaintexts – resulted from decryption of ciphertext se-
quences Δ and c – (tAggr), and test if the ciphertext sequences are quadratic
residue or not (tQR). Therefore, the computation overhead of tree traver-
sal is (N0.5−1/2d + m).(tFis + tAggr + tQR); the computational cost of Fis-
chlin protocol, the result aggregation and quadratic residue test is O(λl),
O(k) and O(λ). Therefore, the computational cost of traversing the tree is
O(N0.5−1/2d +m)(k + λl).
− Point queries. Similarly, the computation overhead of executing an exact-
matching query will be O((k + λl) logN) on each assisting server.
In addition in the case of max/min aggregate functions, if a record satisfies
the query condition(s), the assisting server must execute the Fischlin protocol to
find the maximum/minimum of the encrypted records. This step imposes additional
computational cost of m.tFis = O(mlλ) to the assisting server.
5.5.3 Implementation and Performance
To evaluate the performance of the proposed protocol, we implemented a prototype of
system relying on some existing works [129] in Java 1.6. The secret keys p and q of the
GM cryptosystem are 256-bit long. Moreover, we used the publicly available Breast
Cancer data set [130]. This data set has 286 records with 9 categorical attributes.
The patient’s and the server’s side experiments were conducted on an Intel dual Core
i5 2.3GHz Notebook with 4GB RAM. The number of patients in each group is fixed at
L = 286 leading to approximately 81800 patients in the PHR system. To understand
the source of the overhead, we conduct diﬀerent experiments. In the first one, we
measure the query execution time for diﬀerent types of aggregate SQL queries, but
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running with only one core enabled. The result is presented in Table 13 and Fig. 19
where the error parameter λ of Fischlin protocol is 45.
Query Query time(ms)











Figure 19: Query Time
In the second experiment, we study the eﬀect of the error parameter λ on the
execution time given diﬀerent values for the threshold k. The tested values of the
error parameter λ give a comparable level of correctness. As presented in Fig. 20,
the time complexity of the threshold decryption is linear with the error parameter
λ. When k is small, the query time is dominated by Fischlin’s protocol which is
independent from the threshold k. Therefore, there is a small diﬀerence in the query
time when k = 36 and k = 71. However, as k increases the eﬀect of the threshold
decryption becomes more visible and the execution time starts to grow. Fig. 21
presents the eﬀect of the threshold k on the execution time, given diﬀerent values for
the error parameter λ. According to a similar analysis, for small value of k there is a
small change in the execution time but as k increases the query time becomes linear
with k.
100





























Figure 20: Eﬀect of λ for various values of k

























Figure 21: Eﬀect of k for various values of λ
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Finally, we calculate the execution time of an arbitrary SQL query assuming
λ = 45 and k = n
4
= 71. In addition to λ and k, the execution time of a query
heavily depends on the number of comparisons that are performed to traverse the
kD-tree. Therefore, we consider three diﬀerent scenarios: (1) the worst case scenario
is when evaluating predicates targeting a single attribute for interval matching such
that all the tree nodes are traversed, (2) the best case scenario is when evaluating
predicates targeting all attributes for exact matching, and (3) the real-world sce-
nario is when evaluating predicates targeting multiple attributes for range and exact
matching predicates. In the worst case, the time required to evaluate the predicate
is 110 seconds (approximately 2 minutes) for each group, whereas in the best case
it is 0.3 seconds. In the real-world scenario, we derive the execution time of a SQL
query that contains interval matching and exact matching predicates. For each type
of predicate, we execute four SQL queries with diﬀerent number of attributes. The
results are presented in Fig. 22. The results indicate that as the number of attributes
in the query increases, the execution time decreases due to the limited search space
and the reduction of the number of comparisons.


















Figure 22: Query time of a SQL query that contains exact matching (blue) and
interval matching (red) predicates
102
Our experimental results indicate that the proposed protocol would work well
with medium size databases (with a total number of 100,000-400,000 patients) and
the queries that contain multiple attributes. These results are from a first implemen-
tation of the proposed protocol. Further optimizations may likely lead to a better
performance.
5.6 Conclusions and Discussion
In this chapter, we presented a protocol for executing secure queries over the cloud-
based personal health records that employs private integer comparison and threshold
cryptosystems to protect the query privacy of the health organization and the data
privacy of the patients. In this section, we will answer some frequently raised ques-
tions.
Probabilistic Encryption vs. Deterministic Encryption. A deter-
ministic encryption scheme always produces the same ciphertext for a given plaintext.
Deterministic public-key encryption is not secure in particular when the domain of
the message is small since the adversary can simply encrypt each of the possible value
in the domain under the recipient’s public key, and compare the resulted ciphertext to
the target ciphertext. To avoid this, probabilistic encryption utilizes randomness such
that when encrypting the same message several times, it will yield diﬀerent cipher-
texts. Probabilistic public-key encryption schemes are slower than the symmetric-key
encryption. In this thesis, we utilized two probabilistic encryption schemes (including
Paillier [26] and Goldwasser-Micali [42]). Despite being slower, these schemes provide
security for the records in the database. It is worth to mention that health orga-
nizations do not frequently conduct statistical analysis and studies on the medical
databases (every month or when there is a pandemic).
Encryption Devices. The proposed protocol requires that the patients store
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the secret keys on the cloud machines. More precisely, the patients store their share
of secret key on a FPGA and deliver it to the cloud server for the operation. The
security concerns regarding key storage on cloud machines may cause patients to
continue hosting the encryption/decryption operations using traditional privately-
held servers. In this case, even though clients can leverage the computational and
storage power of the cloud for the database and analytics, they must still maintain
one or more local servers to perform encryption and execute decryption requests from
assisting server. Unfortunately, in this case many of the advantages of the cloud are
nullified, since patients still need local infrastructure. Furthermore, the cloud service




Conclusions and Future Work
The main goal of this thesis is to present protocols for privacy-preserving query pro-
cessing over databases that are outsourced to cloud servers. We assume that the
textual shape of SQL queries is not private but the constants contain sensitive infor-
mation and must be protected against curious cloud servers. Therefore, the proposed
protocols reveal the attribute names and the type of the aggregate function to the
cloud server. The proposed protocols leverage symmetric private information retrieval
(SPIR) and private integer comparison to protect the access privacy of clients as well
as the database privacy of data owners in the cloud environment. Chapter 4 con-
siders the case where the database owner is trusted for collecting and storing the
records that belong to the individuals. We provide a solution for secure storage of
the database records on the cloud server. Furthermore, our solution addressed two
types of queries: keyword search queries and SQL queries. We proposed to organize
the database records as a left-balancing binary search tree. Execution of the query
can be performed by traversing the tree in the oblivious manner.
In chapter 5, we consider the scenario where the individuals are not willing that
the data owner collects and manages their record. In particular, we propose a query
processing model in the context of the cloud-based Personal Health Records (PHRs)
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where the patients are responsible for managing their medical record, controlling the
access and protecting them against the curious cloud server. We propose to organize
the patients in smaller group where the members of each group encrypt their records
with jointly generated keys. For query execution, we utilized an approach similar to
the one we provided in Chapter 4. Note that the proposed model can be utilized in
situations where a database has been horizontally partitioned between diﬀerent par-
ties and the client would like to execute a private query over the distributed database.
The results of the complexity analysis indicates that the proposed protocols incur rea-
sonable communication and computation overhead on the client side, considering the
added advantage of being able to perform symmetrically-private database search. We
tested our implementation in Java 1.6 by employing a real data set. We observed that
the running time for executing range queries is more than partial-matching queries.
This observation agree well with the result of the complexity analysis. Furthermore,
we observed as the number of attributes in the predicate of a query increase, the exe-
cution time decreases. Finally, we concluded that our proposed protocol would work
well with the small to medium size databases and the queries that contain multiple
attributes.
In the remaining of this chapter, we will highlight some of the future works
related to this work.
6.1 Future Work
The work presented in this thesis, can be extended in several directions. In what
follows, we briefly summarize some possible future research works.
Other SQL Queries. In this thesis, we have considered only static data. Al-
though some applications have relatively stable data contents, many scenarios for
database outsourcing require the system to support data dynamics. For example, in
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the cloud-based PHR case discussed in Chapter 5, patients may conduct new medical
examinations and need to add new information to the outsourced database. In addi-
tion, they may find that some data have been miscalculated and need to be updated.
An extension to this work can explore preserving the privacy of sensitive information
within SQL INSERT, UPDATE and DELETE data manipulation statements.
Protecting The Shape of The Query. In this thesis, we assume that the
shape of the SQL query is not private and our goal to protect query privacy was based
on hiding the constants in the query predicate. Simultaneous protection of both the
shape and the constants of a query can be considered as an interesting extension to
our work.
Database Partitioning. Recently, the need of the distributed database system
increases in order to reduce communication cost and improve reliability. In this
case, the original database records are partitioned horizontally [131] or vertically
[132] and each partition is outsourced to a database node. Horizontal partitioning
allows access methods such as tables, indices and views to be partitioned into disjoint
sets of rows that are physically stored and accessed separately. On the other hand,
vertical partitioning allows a table to be partitioned into disjoint sets of columns.
An interesting extension for our work is to study symmetrically-private search on
vertical/horizontal partitioned databases.
Malicious Adversaries. The assumed adversary model in this thesis was
semi-honest. This is a common adversary model used in the SMC literature [108].
A common approach to secure a protocol against malicious adversaries is done by
requiring each party to use zero-knowledge proofs [37] to prove that it is following
the protocol specifications. Since this generic approach adds considerable overhead to
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